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I. Introduction
Just imagine the headlines if teams started contributing to referees based
on how that referee called their games. Sports fans everywhere would be
absolutely outraged.'
In the 1999-2000 election cycle, the two major political parties raised
$1.2 billion.2 Of that amount, $495.1 million was "soft money."3 By the end
of the 1999-2000 cycle, more than 130 different groups had aired over 1,100
"issue advertisements" costing approximately $500 million.4 The press, public
interest groups, and politicians are calling for reform of the current campaign
finance system. However, questions remain as to what reforms would fix the
campaign finance system's problems and, significantly, whether these reforms
would be constitutional.
During the 2000 presidential primary, Senator John McCain campaigned
on specific campaign finance reforms, including a ban on soft money and
disclosure of issue ads.' Although it was McCain's ran for the presidency that
helped the public focus on the problems of the campaign finance system,
1. See 145 CoNG. REc. H8190 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1999) (statement of Rep. Hooley)
(comparing sports payoffs to current campaign finance system).
2. Press Release, Federal Election Commission, FEC Reports Increase in Party Fundrais-
ing for 2000 (May 15, 2001), available at http'/www.fec.gov/press/051501partyfund/051501
partyfund.html.
3. Id. Soft money is money that is not regulated under the Federal Election Campaign
Act (FECA). Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat 3. The
current campaign finance system does not limit contributions to a political party committee as
long as the unlimited funds are not used directly for the assistance of a candidate for federal
office. See infra notes 172-86 and accompanying text (describing evolution of soft money).
Soft money may not be donated directly to the campaign of a federal candidate; contributions
to candidates are limited by FECA. See infra notes 172-86.
4. Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Introduction to IssueAdvertising in the 1999-2000 Election
Cycle, Annenburg Public Policy Center of University of Pennsylvania, at httpJ/www.appepenn.
org/issueads/1999-2000issueadvocacy.pdf (last visited Nov. 5,2001).
5. See Cathleen Decker, Presidential Hopeful McCain Calls for Ban on 'Soft Money'
Politics, LAL TIMES, June 7, 1999, atA3, available at 1999 WL 2175227 (discussing McCain
campaign speech concerning his proposed campaign reforms).
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Congress has been debating his proposals for years." Senator McCain, along
with Senator Russell Feingold and Representatives Christopher Shays and
Marty Meehan, have introduced legislation that would ban soft money in
federal campaigns.' In the 106th Congress, the bill sponsored by Representa-
tives Shays and Meehan passed the House of Representatives but died in the
Senate.! Much of the debate surrounding the bill focused on the constitu-
tionality of the reforms.9
The survival of the reforms depends upon which constitutional standard
the Supreme Court applies. In 1976, the Supreme Court announced the
current standard for examining limits on campaign contributions in Buckley
v. Valeo.1° The Buckley Court applied "exacting scrutiny" under the First
6. H.R. 308, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 27, 107th Cong. (2001); HR. 417 106th Cong.
(1999); S. 26, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 3526 105th Cong. (1998).
7. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2001, S. 27, 107th Cong.; Bipartisan Campaign
Finance Reform Act of 2001, H.R. 380,107th Cong, see infra notes 201-22 and accompanying
text (describing S. 27 and I-t. 380). The bill also restricts "issue ads." S.27; HR. 380. Issue
ads are political advertisements that do not specifically advocate election or defeat of a political
candidate. See also infra notes 187-95 and accompanying text (defining "issue ad").
8. See 145 CONG. REC. H8286 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1999) (listing roll call vote on H.R.
417, Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 1999); 145 CoNG. REc. S12803 (daily ed.
Oct. 19, 1999) (cataloguing failure of motion for cloture on amendment to S. 1593, Bipartisan
Finance Campaign Reform Act of 1999).
9. See, e.g., 145 CONG. REc. H8188 (daily ed. Sept 14, 1999) (statement of Rep.
Thomas) (arguing that Shays-Mechan "tromps all over" First Amendment protections and
"would be declared unconstitutional").
10. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam); see inra notes 72-140 and accompanying text (detail-
ing Supreme Court's decision in Buckley). In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court reviewed the constitu-
tionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA). Buckley v. Valo, 424 U.S. 1,
6 (1976) (per curiam). The Court first upheld the limits on the amount of money that individuals
and organizations could contribute to federal candidates, political committees, and political
parties. Id. at 12-38. The Court reasoned that the governmental interest in preventing corruption
and the appearance of corruption outweighed the minor restrictions on the speech and associa-
tion rights of potential donors. Id. at 58. The Court next looked at the restrictions on expendi-
tures for individuals, candidates, and campaigns. Id. at 39-58. The Court struck down these
limits because they burdened more speech than necessary. Id. at 39. Although the Court found
that the limits on contributions adequately furthered the interest in preventing corruption, the
Court also determined that the limits on expenditures actually reduced the amount of political
discourse. Id. at 45, 58-59.
The Court then focused on FECA's disclosure and reporting requirements. Id. at 60-84.
Although the requirements would discourage some donors, the Court concluded that the dis-
closure provisions burdened speech only slightly and provided a transparent system that
promoted the prevention of corruption. Id. at 64, 66-68, 84. The Court next looked at FECA's
system of public financing for presidential campaigns. Id. at 85-109. The Court upheld the
system as a proper exercise of Congress's power to regulate federal elections. Id at 90-91. The
Court rejected the argument that the requirements for funding, which require a candidate or party
to gain specific percentages of the vote in order to qualify for the funds, invidiously discrimi-
nated against minor party candidates. Id. at 94-95. Finally, the Court invalidated the creation
of the Federal Election Commission because it violated the Appointments Clause. Id. at 109-43.
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Amendment to various campaign reforms passed by Congress." The limits
on political speech could survive only if they were "closely drawn" to serve
a 'significant" government interest.12 The Court identified two government
interests that justified the restrictions upheld in Buckley - preventing the
corruption of officeholders and candidates and preventing the appearance of
corruption." In subsequent decisions, the Court has assumed that these two
interests are the only interests that allow restrictions on campaign finance to
pass constitutional scrutiny. 4 Therefore, any campaign finance reform that
does not further one of these two interests will not be upheld."5 Instead, a
limitation on campaign finance that does not prevent corruption or the appear-
ance of corruption will be deemed an unconstitutional restriction on speech. 6
For example, restricting soft money does not prevent the possibility of a
quid pro quo between a donor and a candidate because soft money is donated
to political parties and not to individual candidates." Because the money is
not donated directly to any federal candidate, there is no candidate for the
donor to influence.' A ban on soft money, therefore, may not satisfy this
strict standard.' 9 The same can be said for a ban on issue ads. A candidate
who is featured in an issue ad has not received anything by the group paying
for the advertisement. 2 This is because, by definition, the ad cannot expressly
promote or oppose a federal candidate.2' The opportunity for the advertiser
11. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16 (per curian) (describing level of scrutiny to be applied).
12. Id. at25.
13. See infra notes 79-86 and accompanying text (explaining how Buckley Court justified
upholding contribution limits).
14. See infra notes 141-63 and accompanying text (looking at cases in which Supreme
Court has identified interest in preventing corruption or preventing appearance of corruption
as only interests sufficient to overcome exacting scrutiny required by Buckley).
15. See infra notes 141-63 and accompanying text (illustrating how Supreme Court
requires campaign reforms to prevent corruption orto prevent appearance of corruption in order
to pass constitutional scrutiny).
16. See infra notes 143-63 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court cases that
upheld only those restrictions that prevented corruption).
17. See infra notes 232-49 and accompanying text (describing how soft money is analyzed
under current constitutional standard).
18. See infra notes 172-73 and accompanying text (explaining how soft money is donated
not to individual candidates, but to political committees).
19. Seeinfranotes232-49andaccompanyingtext(valuaingsoftmoneybanunderBuckley).
20. In fact, candidates are frequently upset by groups who run issue ads in their districts.
See, e.g., Lou Cannon, Single-Issue Ads Driving California Race; House Hopefuls Vie to Be
Heard Above Big-Money Onslaughts, WASIH POST, Feb. 21, 1998, at A4 (discussing 1998
special election for California's 22nd district Congressional seat in which issue ads dominated
campaigns); see also Gagging Voters, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 27,1998, A12 (dis-
cussing animosity candidates feel for issue ads because they cannot control content of such ads).
21. See infra notes 187-95 and accompanying text (discussing how issue advertisements
cannot expressly advocate election or defeat of federal candidate).
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to influence the candidate is diminished because the candidate has nothing for
which to be grateful. As these examples illustrate, the standard applied by the
Court stands in the way of many of the proposed reforms.
The Supreme Court's current emphasis on preventing corruption may
seal the fate ofthe proposed reforms.' However, several Justices have grown
increasingly dissatisfied with the current campaign finance jurisprudence laid
out in Buckley and its progeny.' If the Court's standard changes, the fate of
the proposed reforms may change with it.24
In one of the Supreme Court's most recent decisions dealing with cam-
paign finance reform, Nixon v. ShrinkMissouri GovernmentPAC,' six Justices
expressed their unhappiness with Buckley.26 Because of their dissatisfaction,
the Justices offered four competing fiameworks for evaluating campaign
finance reform.' The most radical idea was that of Justice Stevens; he sug-
22. See infra notes 229-67 and accompanying text (describing how corruption analysis
may stand in way of reform).
23. See infra notes 270-300 and accompanying text (examining current Supreme Court's
dissatisfaction with Buckley standard).
24. See infra Part IV (evaluating how fate of reform proposals would change based on
application of differing constitutional standards).
25. 528 U.S. 377 (2000). More recently, the Court decided FEC v. Colorado Republican
Federal Campaign Committee, 121 S. Ct. 2351 (2001). Colorado Republican dealt with the
regulation of expenditures that are coordinated between candidates and campaigns. Id. at 2356.
Because this Note focuses on two specific campaign finance issues, soft money and issue adver-
tisements, and not on coordinated expenditures, the Court's decision in Colorado Republican
is not discussed in detail. However, this decision is relevant to determine the attitude of the
current Court toward campaign finance issues in general. See infra note 319 (discussing rele-
vance of Colorado Republican on Court's formulation of standard of review for campaign
finance issues).
26. See infra notes 268-300 and accompanying text (outlining various opinions in Shrink
PAC). In ShrinkPAC, the Supreme Court considered whetherBuckley controlled state campaign
contribution limits and whether the specific limits approved in Buckley were the minimum limits
allowable. Id. at 381-82. Mssouri set maximum contribution limits for various state candidates
from $250 to $1000 depending on the specified office or size of constituency. Id. at 382. The
Shrink PAC Court reiterated the reasoning from Buckley, stating that contribution limits place
less of a burden on speech than do expenditure limits. Id. at 386-89. In Buckley, the Court
identified preventing corruption, Missouri's stated interest in Shrink PAC, as a legitimate state
interest in limiting campaign contributions. Id. at 390. The fact that Missouri did not present
empirical evidence proving that the limits would prevent corruption was not fatal to their case
because the influence of large donations on candidates had been established in Buckley. Id. at
390-93. The Shrink PAC Court then stated that a contribution limit would be considered an
unconstitutional abridgement of the contributor's speech only when the limit was so low as to
"render political association ineffective, drive the sound of a candidate's voice below the level
of notice, and render contributions pointless." Id. at 397. Although the Shrink PAC Court
concluded that there was no reason that Buckley should not control state-level contribution
limits, the actual dollar amounts of the limits in Buckley were not controlling. Id. at 397-98.
27. See infra notes 270-300 and accompanying text (discussing different suggestions in
Shrink PA C).
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gested a fundamental departure from the Supreme Court's previous approach
to regulations of campaign finance activity.' He declared that the Buckley
Court's reliance on the First Amendment was misplaced. 9 "Money is prop-
erty," he wrote, "it is not speech. 30 Justice Stevens concluded that because
the Court should view political contributions as property, the Court should
review such restrictions under the due process clause.31 To illustrate his point,
he drew a distinction between a candidate who speaks for himself and a
candidate who hires someone to speak for him. 2 Justice Stevens noted that
although both activities deserve constitutional protection, "bought" speech de-
serves less protection than does the right to speak for oneself.33 This "money
is property, not speech" argument would permit a more lenient level of scru-
tiny for campaign reform measures thanthe Buckley standard.34 Thus, a reform
that would assert a significant interest other than the prevention of corruption
could survive Justice Stevens's standard. 5
On the other hand, Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, found that
the basic speech framework of Buckley was appropriate, but questioned the
Court's application of Buckley.35 Justice Breyer claimed that Buckley was
flexible enough for the legislative and executive branches to enact and to
enforce more stringent campaign finance measures. 7 He envisioned the Court
as "balanc[ing] interests" and "defer[ring] to empirical legislative judgments"
when evaluating campaign finance reforms.3 ' Although Justice Breyer be-
lieved that the Buckley opinion allowed for this kind of balancing test, he
declared that ifBuckley did not allow for such a test, the Constitution required
a reconsideration ofBuckley. 9 Thus, a reform that would assert a significant
28. See ShrinkPAC, 528 U.S. at 398-99 (Stevens, J., concurring) (suggesting that Court
should look at campaign finance as money, not speech).
29. See id. at 398 (Stevens, J., concurring) (declaring that money is not speech).
30. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
31. See id. at 398-99 (Stevens, J., concurring) (explaining that money is property and that
property rights are not afforded same level of protection as pure speech).
32. See id. at 399 (Stevens, J., concurring) (differentiating "speech by proxy" from "the
right to say what one pleases").
33. See id. at 398-99 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that inspiring volunteers with words
deserves more protection than inspiring people to do same work through money).
34. See id. at 399 (Stevens, 3., concurring) (asserting that property rights "are not entitled
to the same protection" as speech rights).
35. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
36. See id. at 402-03 (Breyer, J., concurring) (asserting that when law implicates multiple
constitutional interests, Court should balance interests).
37. See id. at 404 (Breyer, 3., concurring) (explaining that Buckley Court left room for
additional restrictions on campaign financing).
38. Id. at 402 (Breyer, 3., concurring).
39. See id. at405 (Breyer, 3., concurring) (announcing that "the Constitution would require
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interest other than the prevention of corruption could survive Justice Breyer's
standard.
40
A fourth Justice in ShrinkPAC, Justice Kennedy, also voiced his uneasi-
ness about the system created in Buckley. 1 In his dissent, Justice Kennedy
contended that the Buckley framework protected the worst kinds of political
speech - soft money and issue ads - and drowned out the speech that should
be most protected - contributions of individuals. 2 He concluded that by
relying on Buckley, the Supreme Court created a campaign finance system that
was more offensive to the First Amendment than the system the Court rejected
in Buckley.43 He would require close scrutiny for provisions such as the one
at issue in ShrinkPAC, a provision that restricted the amount of direct contri-
butions to candidates." Overall, Justice Kennedy believed that although the
First Amendment protected a system of direct contributions, it did not neces-
sarily protect the "covert speech" that Buckley allowed. Thus, a reform that
would prevent a significant interest other than quid pro quo corruption could
also survive Justice Kennedy's standard.
Finally, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, contended that the
majority's application of Buckley "balance[d] away First Amendment free-
doms. 46 Justice Thomas would apply strict scrutiny to all campaign finance
measures, requiring narrowly tailored means to promote a compelling govern-
ment interest. 47 Thus, even those reforms which would prevent quid pro quo
corruption would not necessarily be safe under Justice Thomas's proposal.
[the Court] to reconsider Buckley" ifBuckley did not allow "the political branches sufficient lee-
way to enact comprehensive solutions" to campaign reform problems).
40. See infra notes 276-86 and accompanying text (evaluating fate of current campaign
finance reform proposals under Justice Breyer's framework).
41. See ShrinkPAC, at 405-10 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (declaring that majority in Shrink
PAC "perpetuates and compounds a serious distortion of the First Amendment resulting from
[the Supreme Court's] own intervention in Buckley").
42. See id. at 406-07 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (lamenting system that allows unlimited
"covert speech" like soft money and issue ads, while limiting financial contributions to candi-
dates that are subject to full disclosure).
43. See id. at 408 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (asserting that "[o]ur First Amendment prin-
ciples surely tell us that an interest thought to be the compelling reason for enacting a law is cast
into grave doubt when a worse evil surfaces in the law's actual operation").
44. See id. at 406 (Kennedy, 3., dissenting) (decrying how Court has "abandon[ed] the
rigors of [the Court's] traditional First Amendment structure").
45. See id. at 408 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (concluding that "the law before [the Shink
PAC Court] cannot pass any serious standard of First Amendment review"). Justice Kennedy
concluded that "Buckley has not worked" and that any limitations on direct campaign contribu-
tions and expenditures present constitutional problems. Id. at 408-09.
46. Id. at 410 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
47. See id. at 427 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (defining standard that he believed should be
applied to evaluate limits at issue inShrinkPAC).
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Given all of these competing frameworks, what should be the proper
standard for evaluating restrictions on campaign financing? What kind of
campaign finance proposals will survive constitutional analysis? This Note
will explore these questions. Part H of this Note reviews the current state of
the law regarding campaign finance reform.' More specifically, it examines
the law that produced the decision in Buckley, the way in which Buckley
actually defined the outer limits of campaign contributions, and how the
Supreme Court has narrowed Buckley to reject all campaign finance proposals
that do not advance the interests of preventing corruption or preventing the
appearance of corruption.49 Part III discusses the current campaign finance
reform proposals and how they attempt to fix the perceived problems."0 Part
IV looks at how the reforms would fare under the current constitutional
standard and evaluates the fate of the proposed reforms under the different
standards suggested by the Justices in Shrink PAC.51 This Part also re-exam-
ines what the Court said in Buckley and suggests that Buckley may be more
flexible than indicated by its current application. 2 Finally, Part V concludes
that the opinion in Buckley, the objections made by Justice White as to its
subsequent application, and the Court's action in Shrink PAC prove that cam-
paign finance reform and the First Amendment are not mutually exclusive. 3
More specifically, this Note concludes that preventing quid pro quo corruption
need not be the only government interest promoted by a reform in order for
that reform to pass constitutional scrutiny. 4
ff. The Current Standard: Exacting Scrutiny and the
Prevention of Corruption"5
Under current campaign finance jurisprudence, courts analyze restric-
tions on campaign contributions and expenditures as potential restrictions on
48. See infra Part R (outlining current test for evaluating campaign finance proposals).
49. See infra notes 141-63 and accompanying text (explaining how standard that applies
to campaign finance measures evolved).
50. See infra Part III (examining soft money and issue advertisement provisions of current
Congressional proposals).
51. See infra Part IV (considering effect of different constitutional standards on validity
of current reform proposals).
52. See inra notes 301-21 and accompanying text (questioning whether corruption and
prevention of corruption are only interests that could justify restrictions on campaign finance).
53. See infra Part V looking at ability of Court to allow campaign finance reforms with-
out ignoring First Amendment implications of such reforms).
54. See infra Part V (concluding that Buckley did not restrict significant interests to only
prevention of corruption).
55. For purposes of this Note, preventing corruption also includes the interest in prevent-
ing the appearance of corruption.
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the freedoms of speech and association under the First Amendment."s The
United States Supreme Court first articulated this framework in Buckley v.
Valeo.' The Court has continued to view cases restricting campaign finance
primarily as speech cases.s It is this framework, first announced in Buckley,
that the Justices called into question in Shrink PAC.
A. The Federal Election Campaign Act
The modem federal campaign finance system began when Congress
passed the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA).59 Overall, FECA
regulated media communications, limited the amount candidates could contrib-
ute to their own campaigns, and established a disclosure system.' In 1974,
Congress expanded the system created in FECA.' The 1974 amendments to
FECA broadened the contribution requirements, placed expenditure limitations
on individuals, campaigns and candidates, established the public financing sys-
tem for presidential elections, and created the Federal Election Commission.62
56. See infra notes 72-163 and accompanying text (discussing speech framework as estab-
lished in Buckley and its progeny).
57. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam); see infra notes 72-140 and accompanying text
(examining Court's opinion inBuckley).
58. See infra notes 141-63 and accompanying text (describing how Court has analyzed
campaign finance cases).
59. See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat 3 (limiting
contributions to federal political campaigns from personal funds or immediate family and
requiring disclosure from candidates and political committees).
60. See id. (creating new campaign finance system). More specifically, the Act limited
the amount of money that a candidate could spend on communications media. Id. § 104 (pro-
hibiting candidates from spending more than greater of $50,000 or S.10 multiplied by voting
age population in geographic area in which election was held). FECA also required broad-
casters to give political advertisers their lowest unit rate. See id. § 103(bX1) (requiring broad-
casters to charge candidates "the lowest unit charge of the station for the same class and amount
of time for the same period" for advertising time 60 days before general election or 45 days
before primary election). The Act limited the amount of money a candidate could receive or
spend from his or her personal funds or from members of the candidate's immediate family. See
id. § 203 (prohibiting candidates from using personal funds in excess of $50,000 if candidate
for President, $35,000 if candidate for Senate, and $25,000 if candidate for House of Represen-
tatives). FECA established rules defining political committees and requiring disclosure of
campaign and committee contributions and expenditures. See id. §§ 301-11 (establishing
reporting and disclosure system that required political committees and candidate committees
to disclose information on amount of money received and spent by such committees).
61. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88
Stat 1263 [hereinafter FECA Amendments of 1974] (establishing comprehensive contribution
and expenditure limits, creating Federal Election Commission, and instituting public financing
for presidential campaigns).
62. See id. (expanding campaign finance system). The amendments expanded the con-
tribution requirements to apply to all federal campaign donors. See id. § 101 (placing limita-
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FECA, as amended, also limited expenditures in several different con-
texts.' The amendments created a formula that limited the amount of money
a candidate could spend on his own campaign based on the voting age popula-
tion ofthe candidate's district.' FECA placed similar restrictions on expendi-
tares of political parties by limiting their expenditures to an amount based on
the voting age population for the district in which the party was acting.65 The
amendments also limited any expenditures made by individuals and groups,
"relative to a clearly identified candidate," to $1,000 per year per candidate.'
Additionally, the Act expanded the disclosure and reporting require-
ments.6' To administer the new requirements, the amendments created the
Federal Election Commission." The Commission was created to be the repos-
itory of all campaign finance disclosures and the body that enforced the pro-
visions of the Act.69 Finally, FECA provided for a system of public funding
for presidential nominating conventions and presidential campaigns.7" The
Court decided the constitutionality of FECA in Buckley v. Valeo. 1
B. Buckley v. Valeo
In Buckley,"2 candidates, office holders, contributors, and political com-
mittees challenged the constitutionality of FECA, as amended by the 1974
Act.73 Among other objections, they contended that the limits on contribu-
tions to federal campaigns and the limits on expenditures of such campaigns
tions on contributions and expenditures related to federal elections). Individual donors were
limited to contributions of $1,000 per candidate per election; political committees could
contribute only $5,000 per candidate per election. Id. § l(bX1)-2). Individual donors were
also subject to a $25,000 annual limit for their aggregate donations to any federal campaign
activity. Id. § 101(bX3).
63. See id. § 101(c), (e), (f) (creating limits on overall campaign expenditures).
64. Id. § 101(c). For example, a candidate for the House of Representatives (from a state
that was allotted more than one member in the House) could spend no more than the greater of
$100,000 or $.08 multiplied by the voting age population. Id.
65. Id. § 101(). For example, a national party committee could spend no more than S.02
times the voting age population of the United States on any expenditure in connection with a
candidate for the Presidency. Id. Likewise, a national party committee could spend no more
than $.02 times the population of the state toward the election of a Senator from that state. Id.
66. Id. § 101(e). For example, an individual who wished to produce their own ad about
a candidate or campaign could spend only $1,000 on such communication. Id.
67. Id. § 201.
68. Id. § 208.
69. See id § 209 (defining duties of Commission).
70. Id. §§406,408.
71. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
72. Id.
73. See id. at 6-12 (describing plaintiffs and their claims).
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violated First Amendment speech and association rights." The Court con-
cluded that FECA implicated First Amendment interests in political expres-
sion and association by regulating the amount of money candidates could
spend and how much contributors could donate.7" The regulations on contrib-
uting and spending money triggered the First Amendment because to be effec-
tive, modem communication requires money.76 Therefore, the Supreme Court
examined FECA's provisions as potential inflingements of the freedoms of
speech and association under the First Amendment.7 Ultimately, the Court
found the limits on the amount that a donor could contribute constitutional,
but found the expenditure limits unconstitutional.78
1. Contrbution Limits
FECA's contribution limits survived constitutional scrutiny because they
served the government's significant interests in preventing corruption and pre-
venting the appearance of corruption.79 The Court emphasized that corrup-
tion referred to the potential for quid pro quo between donors and candi-
dates.8" On the other side ofthe balance, the Court recognized that the contri-
bution limits inhibited the First Amendment rights of the appellants." The
Buckley Court emphasized that the expenditure of some amount of money is
required for almost all types of comuUnication.82 However, the Justices con-
74. See id. at 11 (stating appellant's position that "limiting the use of money for political
purposes constitutes a restriction on communication violative of the First Amendment, since
virtually all meaningful political communications in the modem setting involve the expenditure
of money").
75. Id. at23.
76. See id. at 19 (stating that "[t]he electorate's increasing dependence on televisions,
radio and other mass media for news and information has made these expensive modes of
communication indispensable instruments of effective political speech").
77. See id. at 16 (distinguishing FECA from cases in which Court upheld restrictions on
expressive conduct and stating that "this Court has never suggested that the dependence of a
communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element
or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the FirstAmendment").
78. See infra notes 79-86 and accompanying text (explaining how Court evaluated con-
tribution limitations); see also infra notes 87-109 and accompanying text (discussing Court's
examination of expenditure limitations).
79. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-28 (1976) (per curian) (explaining that "the
integrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined" when large contributors are
able to secure quid pro quos from elected officials).
80. See id. at 26-27 (speaking about corruption in terms of "quid pro quo" arrangements
between donors, federal candidates, and officeholders).
81. See id. at 24-25 (stating that FECA's contribution limitations restrict one aspect of
donor's freedom of political association).
82. See id. at 19 ("A restriction of the amount of money a person or group can spend...
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cluded that the limitations did not materially alter the ability of the public to
discuss political issues." The Court further reasoned that the contribution
limits were narrowly tailored because they restricted only the donor's rights
to contribute to individual candidates, the context in which the possibility for
corruption is the greatest.84 The contribution limits themselves left open other
means of communicating political messages; individuals and groups were free
to engage in political communication independent of the candidates." Apply-
ing this reasoning, the Buckley Court upheld all of the contribution limits.8"
2. Expenditure Limits
The Court's rationale for upholding the contribution limits required the
invalidation of the various limits on expenditures.' Expenditure limits, unlike
limits on contributions, "impose[d] direct and substantial restraints on the
quantity of political speech.""8 FECA contained the following three different
expenditure limits: a $1,000 limitation on expenditures by individuals or
organizations other than candidates and political parties "relative to a clearly
identified candidate;" 9 limits onthe amount a candidate could spend ofhis own
money;' and limits on how much a federal campaign itself could spend.9 1 Ulti-
mately, the Court struck down all of FECA's expenditure limits. 2
necessarily reduces the quantity of expression .... This is because virtually every means of
communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money.").
83. See id. at 29 (concluding that potential for "robust and effective discussion of candi-
dates and campaign issues" was not substantially altered by contribution restrictions).
84. See id. at 28 (finding that contribution limitations focused on problem of large dona-
tions, but left open ability of individuals to engage in "independent political expression").
85. See id. at 28-29 & n.31 (explaining that contribution limits did not prevent individuals
from giving larger donations to candidates by joining together in special interest groups, com-
municating political ideas themselves, and volunteering their time).
86. See id. at 23-38 (upholding $1,000 limit on individual contributions to any one candi-
date, $5,000 limit on political committee contributions to any one candidate, limitations on
volunteer's incidental expenses, and $25,000 aggregate limit on total contributions to federal
candidates in election cycle).
87. See id. at 39-59 (discussing constitutionality of FECA's expenditure limits).
88. See id. at 39 (concluding that effect of restriction was to limit amount of political
speech). The Court noted that "[b]eing free to engage in unlimited political expression subject
to a ceiling on expenditures is like being free to drive an automobile as far and as often as one
desires on a single tank of gasoline." Id. at 19 n.18.
89. See FECA Amendments of 1974, supra note 61, § 101(e)(1) (limiting expenditures
"relative to a clearly identified candidate" to $1,000).
90. See FECA Amendments of 1974, supra note 61, § 608 (aXI) (restricting amount of
money candidate could spend out of personal funds for candidacy).
91. See FECAAmendments of 1974,supra note 61, § 101(c) (prohibiting campaign itself
from spending unlimited amounts on campaign).
92. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58 (1976) (per curiam) (concluding that First
Amendment requires invalidation of expenditure limits).
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The Court first examined the $1,000 limit on expenditures "relative to a
clearly identified candidate.-43 The Court construed that language to restrict
only those advertisements that contained words of express advocacy such as
"'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' 'castyour ballot for,' 'Smith for Congress,' 'vote
against,' 'defeat,' [and] 'reject."' 94 Advertisements that used these "magic
words" were considered "express advocacy" and were subject to the contribu-
tion limits upheld by the Court.95 However, ads that did not use these "magic
words" were "issue ads," which did not employ express advocacy and, thus, did
not fall within the scope of FECAY5
Even when interpreted in this restrictive manner, the Court found the
expenditure limitation unconstitutional.' The governmental interest in pre-
venting corruption was not sufficiently compelling to justify the restrictions
on the speaker/spender's First Amendment right to engage in political advo-
cacy."s In defending the limitation, the government also urged that an interest
in equalizing the ability of various groups and individuals to influence cam-
paigns warranted the expenditure restrictions.' The Court, however, rejected
this contention, stating that "[t]he First Amendment's protection against gov-
enmental abridgement of free expression cannot properly be made to depend
on a person's financial ability to engage in public discussion.""lco
Second, the Court struck down the limitation on expenditures from a can-
didate's own personal or family wealth.' The Justices concluded that there
93. See id at 39-51 (evaluating constitutionality of FECA provision that limits contribu-
tion to expenditures "relative to a clearly identified candidate").
94. Id. at n.52. This construction was necessary to avoid a vagueness challenge. See id.
at 40-44 (determining that vagueness challenge could only be overcome by concluding that
limitation only refers to communications that include "explicit words ofadvocacy").
95. See generally Scott E. Thomas & Jeffrey H. Bowman, Is Soft Money Here to Stay
Under the '7Magic Words"Doctrine?, 10 STAN L. & POL'Y REV. 33, 34 (1998) (outlining his-
torical origin of "magic words" test).
96. See id. (same).
97. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 51 (1976) (per curiam) (finding expenditure limits
unconstitutional).
98. See id. at 45-48 (dismissing government's argument that prevention of corruption
justified limits on independent expenditures). The Court concluded that there was not as great
a possibility for corruption in the case of independent expenditures as there was in direct con-
tributions. Id. at 46. Independent expenditures, by definition, are not controlled by the cam-
paigns. Id. Therefore, the possibility of quid pro quo is diminished because the candidate is not
actually receiving anything from the communicator. Even if the communications advocate in
favor of the candidate, the ad may be counterproductive to the candidate's message. Id. at 47;
see also supra note 20 (citing articles discussing this situation).
99. Buckley, 424 U.S. at48.
100. Id. at 49 (citing Eastern R. Conf. v. Noerr Motors, 365 U.S. 127,136 (1961)).
101. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 51-54 (discussing constitutionality of FECA's provisions
limiting amount candidate may spend of his own money, or his immediate family's money, oa
his own campaign).
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was no possibility of corruption from the use of personal funds." In fact, the
Court postulated that the use of personal funds allowed candidates to rely less
on the contribution of others and, therefore, protected such candidates from
the type of corruptive forces that justified the contribution limitations." 3
Again, the government tried to justify the limitation in the interest of equaliz-
ing the financial resources of candidates for office, but the Court rejected this
argument as well." 4 Ultimately, the Court concluded that the First Amend-
ment did not tolerate the restriction on a candidate's ability to speak on his
own behalf.105
Third, the Court struck down the limitations on aggregate campaign
expenditures by federal campaigns."ca This provision limited the amount any
federal campaign could spend on its own efforts."° In invalidating the limita-
tions, the Court determined that the only danger associated with increasing
campaign costs was the danger of dependence on large contributors.l" Thus,
the Court concluded that the aggregate expenditure provision was unnecessary
because the contribution limits adequately dealt with the danger of corruption
from large contributionsY°9
102. See id at 53 (asserting that candidate's use of personal wealth actually keeps candi-
dates from needing, and therefore from being influenced by, outside donors).
103. See id. (explaining that prevention of corruption is not sufficientjustification to curtail
candidate's right to communicate his ideas because no possibility of outside pressure from
contributors exists when contributor is candidate himself).
104. See id. at 54 (concluding that government could not limit candidate's freedom to
speak on behalf of his own candidacy because of desire to equalize resources of candidates).
The Court added that there was no guarantee that a candidate who spent his or her own money
would not be outspent by a candidate with fewer personal resources, but more productive fund-
raising. See id. (deciding that personal expenditure limitation "may fail to promote financial
equality among candidates").
105. Id.
106. See id. at 54-58 (discussing FECA's limitations on overall campaign expenditures and
concluding that they were unconstitutional).
107. See Buckley, 424 U.S. 54-55 (describing limitations that restricted amount candidate's
campaign committee was allowed to spend depending on what office candidate sought).
108. See id. at 55 (stating that "major evil" associated with large campaign costs is candi-
date's reliance on large donors).
109. See id. at 55-56 (reasoning that mere growth of campaign costs is not adequate basis
for limiting quantity of speech). The Court again rejected the argument that there was an interest
in equalizing financial resources of candidates:
Given the limitation on the size of outside contributions, the financial resources
available to a candidate's campaign, like the number of volunteers recruited, will
normally vary with the size and intensity of the candidates's support There is noth-
ing invidious, improper, or unhealthy in permitting such funds to be spent to carry
the candidate's message to the electorate,
Id. at 56. However, the Court did uphold the voluntary limits on presidential campaigns
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3. Other Provisions
The Buckley Court also looked at the following three constitutionally
suspect parts of FECA: the reporting and disclosure requirements, the public
financing system, and the creation of the Federal Election Commission (FEC
or the Commission)."' First, the Court examined the reporting and disclosure
provisions that required candidates, political committees, and donors to report
campaign contributions and expenditures to the FEC. 1  The Court reviewed
the disclosure requirements under the test established in NAACP v. Ala-
bama,"2 which required that the governmental interests survive "exacting
scrutiny.""13 Although the Court acknowledged that the disclosure require-
ments may cause some donors not to contribute, the Court concluded that the
governmental interests in providing information to the voting public, the
interest in preventing corruption, and the interest in gathering information to
detect violations of the contribution limits all justified the requirements." 4
Second, the Court examined the constitutionality of the public financing of
presidential campaigns."' The Court upheld this provision, rejecting claims
that the system discriminated against candidates that did not meet the Act's
required by FECA in order for candidates to receive federal funding. See id. at 85-109 (empha-
sis added) (upholding voluntary expenditure limits).
110. See id. at 60-143 (evaluating provisions of FECA relating to reporting and disclosure,
public financing, and Commission).
111. See id. at 60-84 (analyzing constitutionality of requirements that made political com-
mittees, candidates, candidate committees, and donors disclose information to Commission).
112. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). In NAACP v. Alabama, the State of Alabama brought suit
against the local chapter of the NAACP for not complying with the state's requirements for
filing a corporate charter. NAACP v. Ala., 357 U.S. 449,451 (1958). As part of the litigation,
the NAACP was required to disclose its membership lists. Id. at 454. The NAACP refused and
was held in contempt. Id. at 455. The organization appealed, claiming that such disclosure
violated the members' fundamental rights protected by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment Id. at 460. The NAACP argued that the rights of members to join associa-
tions to promote common beliefs would be violated if they were required to produce the
membership lists. Id. The Court recognized the importance of the right of association declar-
ing, "[i]t is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs
and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech." Id. The Court concluded that,
given the NAACP's showing that their members had been subject to harassment based on their
membership, the disclosure of the membership list could dissuade members from joining and
thus limit the effectiveness of the organization. Id. at 462-63. Alabama's interest in obtaining
the list for litigation was not sufficient to overcome the right of association. Id. at 465-66.
113. See Bucldey v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (per curiam) (explaining that government
cannot compel disclosure by "mere showing of some governmental interest" (citations omitted)).
114. See id. at 66-68, 84 (listing proffered governmentalinterests and concluding that those
interests justified disclosure).
115. See id. at 93-108 (evaluating constitutionality of public financing system).
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qualifications. 6 Finally, the Court invalidated the provision creating the
Commission because it allowed the legislature to appoint executive officers
in violation of the Appointment Clause of the Constitution.11
7
4. Separate Opinions
Several Justices wrote separate concurring and dissenting opinions."'
Justice White wrote a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in
part, arguing that the expenditure limits should be upheld." 9 He pointed out
that campaign funds were not always used for speech purposes and that the
Court had no facts on which to conclude that the limits would restrict the
communication of the candidates. 2° He also criticized the Court's equation
of money and speech by stating that 'the argument that money is speech and
that limiting the flow of money to the speaker violates the First Amendment
proves entirely too much.'
2'
Justice White advocated using a different standard than the "exacting
scrutiny" described in the Court's opinion.12' He described the inquiry in the
following manner: "[S]o long as the purposes [that the expenditure limits]
serve are legitimate and sufficiently substantial" there is "no sound basis for
invalidating [them]."'" Under this standard, Justice White would have upheld
the expenditure limits because they reinforced the contribution limits and
because they might have prevented "unethical practices."'24
116. See id. (concluding that provisions requiring candidates to gain certain percentage of
votes before becoming eligible for federal finding did not invidiously discriminate against
minor, new, and non-party candidates).
117. See id. at 109-43 (rejecting creation of FEC because it allowed legislative branch to
appoint executive officers).
118. See infra notes 119-36 and accompanying text (outlining separate opinions inBuckley).
119. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,257-66 (1976) (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (arguing that expenditure limits in FECA should be upheld because such lim-
itations are neutral and are not motivated by fear of consequences of political speech, and
because interest in preventing corruption is substantial).
120. See id. at 263 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that "t]he
record before us no more supports the conclusion that the communicative efforts of congres-
sional and Presidential candidates will be crippled by the expenditure limitations than it sup-
ports the contrary").
121. See id. at 262 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (contending that
amount of money political campaign has does not necessarily correspond to speech activity).
122. See id. at 263-64 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that
Court should not strike down expenditure limits if they serve a "legitimate and sufficiently sub-
stantial" purpose).
123. Id. at 264 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
124. See id. at 264-65 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (reasoning that
expenditure limits could further two substantial goals - limiting pressure on candidates to raise
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Justice White also criticized the Court's disregard for the reasoned
judgment of Congress. 2 He contended that the legislators, who themselves
had run for office, knew best what is and what is not corrupting. 26 He argued
that the Court should respect the judgement of Congress. 27 In cases after
Buckley, Justice White continued to object to the Court's application of the
First Amendment to campaign finance, not only because he disagreed with the
Court in Buckley, but also because he believed that the Court, in subsequent
cases, interpreted the per curiam opinion incorrectly."
Four other Justices wrote separate opinions as well." Justice Burger
wrote separately because he believed that the disclosure for small donations,
the contribution limits, and the public financing system should not have been
upheld. 3° Justice Marshall believed that the limits on a candidate's expendi-
tures of personal or family funds should have been upheld.' Justice Black-
mun simply stated that he did not agree with the Court's distinction between
large sums of money and preventing possibility of campaigns having so much money that can-
didates devise illegal ways of spending it).
125. See id. at 258 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that Con-
gress believed that both contribution and expenditure limits were required to fully prevent cor-
ruption); id. at 260 (commenting that Congress determined that limitation on independent
expenditures was necessary); id. at 263 (concluding that Congress believed candidate would be
able to communicate his message under expenditure limits); id. at 266 (declaring that "[n]othing
in the First Amendment stands in the way" of Congress's determination that amount ofpersonal
wealth ought to play less important role in political campaigns).
126. See id. at 261 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (pointing out that
"the Court strikes down [the expenditure limit] provision, strangely enough claiming more
insight as to what may improperly influence candidates than is possessed by the majority of
Congress that passed this bill and the President who signed it").
127. See id. at 263 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that
Congress believed candidate would be able to communicate his message under expenditure
limits).
128. See infra notes 148-50 (discussing Justice White's objections to Court's application
of Buckley).
129. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,235-57 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); id. at 286-90 (Marshall, 3., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id at
290 (Blackmun, 3., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 290-94 (Rehnquist, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
130. See id. at 235-57 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding
that disclosure of small contributions did not further interest of preventing corruption, that
contribution limits were as offensive to First Amendment as expenditure limits, and that public
financing was "an impermissible intrusion by the Government into the traditionally private
political process").
131. See id. at 286-90 (Marshall, 3., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that
limits on personal expenditures should be upheld in light of twin goals of promoting access to
ballot and reinforcing.contribution limits).
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contributions and expenditures." Finally, Justice Rehnquist objected to por-
tions of the public financing system because it impermissibly discriminated
against minor party candidates.
133
Since Buckley, courts have applied the speech framework in their review
of campaign finance regulations."M These cases have defined the outer limits
of current campaign finance law.13' The most significant development is that
the Court asserts the prevention of corruption as the only government interest
significant enough to justify regulation on campaign finance.
136
5. Summary
Overall, the Buckley Court upheld portions of FECA, while rejecting
others.13 7 The Court upheld the contribution limits, citing the prevention of
corruption as the significant government interest.13 The Court also upheld the
disclosure requirements and the public financing system.1 9 On the other hand,
the Court rejected all of the expenditure limits (independent expenditures by
individuals, expenditures by candidates of personal money, and expenditures
by campaigns) and the creation ofthe Commission.'
C. Campaign Finance Law Since Buckley: Preventing Corruption as the
Only Significant Government Interest
Understanding the current state of election law requires a brief examina-
tion of Buckley's progeny.'4' Since Buckley, courts have upheld limitations
132. See id. at 290 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that
he was "not persuaded that the Court makes, or indeed is able to make, a principled constitu-
tional distinction between the contribution limitations... and the expenditure limitations").
133. See id. at 290-94 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (determin-
ing that Congress "enshrined the Republican and Democratic Parties in a permanently preferred
position").
134. See infra notes 141-61 and accompanying text (examining how Supreme Court has
applied framework established in Buckley).
135. See infra notes 141-63 and accompanying text (detailing how test for campaign reform
proposals has emerged).
136. See infra notes 141-63 and accompanying text (observing how Supreme Court has
narrowed scope of Buckley to allow restrictions on campaign finance only when there is interest
in preventing possibility of quid pro quo between candidate and donor).
137. Buckley v. Valo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976) (per curiam) (summarizing Court's
findings).
138. Id. at 26,143.
139. Id. at 143.
140. Id.
141. See infra notes 143-63 and accompanying text (outlining major campaign finance
cases after Buckley).
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on campaign financing only when the state's interest in preventing corruption
is significant.1 42 TnFirst National Bank ofBoston v. Bellotti 143 and in Citizens
Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley,144 the Supreme Court extended this
142. See infra notes 143-63 and accompanying text (discussing cases that review restric-
tions on campaign financing solely on ground of whether restriction prevents corruption).
143. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). In Bellotti, the Supreme Court invalidated a Massachusetts
statute that imposed criminal penalties on corporations who made contributions or expenditures
in regard to a ballot question, unless the measure "materially affect[ed] any of the property,
business or assets of the corporation." First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 768
(1978). Several banking associations and corporations wanted to make expenditures to
influence the vote on an amendment to the state constitution that would have instituted a
graduated personal income tax. Id. at 769. The Court declared that speech protected by the
First Amendment does not lose that protection simply because the speaker is a corporation, and
not a natural person. Id. at 784. Because the provision only allowed the corporations to speak
about business related matters, the majority reviewed the law as a subject matter restriction. Id.
at 784-85.
The Court stated the proper test for such a restriction is whether the state can show "a sub-
ordinating interest which is compelling." Id. at 786 (citations omitted). Citing Buckley, the
Justices added that, even if there is a subordinating interest, the means must be "closely drawn
to avoid unnecessary abridgement" Id. (citations omitted). The state claimed that the statute
promoted the government's interests in preserving the integrity of the electoral process, pre-
venting corruption, and promoting civic responsibility in individual citizens. Id. at 789. The
Court rejected the state's arguments because the arguments presumed that corporate involve-
ment in referendums hurt the state's interests; however, there was no showing that the harm was
real. Id. Thus, the Court rejected the contention that precedent supported the restriction on
corporations. Id. at 790. Again citing Buckley, the Justices emphasized that the First Amend-
ment does not allow the government to "enhance the relative voice of others." Id.at 791 (citing
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam)). The Court also noted that the risk
of corruption in candidate elections was not present in referenda. Id. at 790. The Court rejected
the argument that the statute protected shareholders by preventing corporations from using
corporate monies to promote ideas with which the shareholders disagreed. Id. at 792-95.
According to the Court, the statute was underinclusive because it did not prevent the corpora-
tion from spending money on promotion of ideas in other contexts, such as lobbying, and
overinclusive because it would prohibit cooperate expenditures, even if there was unanimous
shareholder agreement Id. at 793-95. The Court concluded that the statute should be invali-
dated because it prohibited speech without furthering a compelling state interest. Id. at 795.
144. 454U.S.290(1981). In CitizensAgainstRentControlthe Courtinvalidated a statute
that placed a $250 limit on contributions to groups formed to support or oppose referenda.
Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290,292 (1981). The majority first
noted that the freedom of association, especially in the context of political association, was
protected by the First Amendment Id. at 295. The Court then stated that "Buckley identified
a single narrow exception to the rule that limits on political activity were contrary to the First
Amendment... the perception of undue influence of large contributors to a candidate." Id. at
296-97. The state claimed that the measure was necessary to prevent individuals from donating
large sums to organizations to hide their identity. Id. at 298. The Court rejected this argument
because the disclosure provisions required groups to publish a list of their donors before the
vote. Id. The Justices noted that the statute only restricted people who wished to speak through
committees. Id. at 299. By limiting contributions to committees, the regulation restricted the
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reasoning to restrictions on contributions and expenditures for ballot initiative
campaigns.' Because ballot initiatives do not involve giving money to a
potential officeholder, the Court reasoned, the concerns for corruption that are
present when the donee is a candidate do not exist.146 The Court insisted that
Buckley identified prevention of corruption as the only interest able to over-
come the exacting scrutiny applied to campaign finance regulations. 47
As he did in Buckley, Justice White dissented in both Bellotti and Citi-
zens Against Rent Control, disagreeing with the Court's application of the
First Amendment to restrictions on political contributions. 4 Justice White
contended that the Buckley Court did not require corruption to be proved to
the exclusion of any other compelling state interest. 49 In Citizens Against
ability of the committees to spend. Id. Thus, the limit "operat[ed] as a direct restraint on free-
dom of expression of a group or committee... ." Id. The majority concluded that the contribu-
tion limits violated the First Amendment by infringing both the right of association and the
individual and collective rights of expression. Id. at 300.
145. See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 765 (invalidating statute that prohibited corporations from
making contributions or expenditures to influence question submitted to voters because First
Amendment does not disfavor communication simply because it is effective); Citizens Against
Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 300 (declaring that limits on contributions to groups advocating or
opposing ballot initiatives violate First Amendment rights of potential contributors).
146. See Bellottfi, 435 U.S. at 790 (asserting that "[t]he risk of corruption perceived in cases
involving candidate elections ... simply is not present in a popular vote on a public issue").
147. See CitizensAgainstRentControl,454 U.S. at 296-97 (concluding that"Buckleyiden-
tified a single narrow exception to the rule that limits on political activity were contrary to the
First Amendment... [t]he perception of undue influence of large contributors to a candidate");
see also Let's Help Fla. v. MeCrary, 621 F.2d 195, 199 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that "[t]he sole
governmental interest the Supreme Court recognized as a justification for restricting contribu-
tions was the prevention of a quid pro quo corruption between a contributor and a candidate").
148. See BeIlotti, 435 U.S. at 802-22 (White, J., dissenting) (determining that preventing
corporate domination of public issues which do not materially affect business is sufcient jus-
tification for limiting ability of those corporations to spend money to influence such public
choices); Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 303 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that
limits on contributions do not control content of speech and do not even limit single group
speech, unlike restrictions in Bellott).
149. See Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 306 (White, J., dissenting) (pointing
out that Buckley Court concluded that discussion of any state interest other than prevention of
corruption was unnecessary in that particular ease, not that there would never be any other
compelling state interest). Justice White also asserted that the Court should adopt an entirely
different standard. See id. at 310 (White, J., dissenting) (stating that "[w]hen the infringement
is as slight and ephemeral as it is here, the requisite state interest to justify the regulation need
not be so high"). He argued that the regulations at issue were content neutral and, therefore, did
not demand the level of scrutiny required by the Court. Id. at 309-10 (White, J., dissenting).
Justice White would allow legislators to regulate those things preventing corporate domination
of public issues when the issue in question does not affect the business of the corporation. See
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 812-13 (White, J., dissenting) (concluding that interest in preventing corpo-
rate management from using corporate funds to promote ideas that do not affect business is suf-
ficiently compelling to allow regulation to stand).
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Rent Control, he pointed out that the Court had listed permissible interests
other than prevention of corruption in Bellotti."'5 Both the language in Buck-
ley and the Court's own admission in Bellotti, that there were other possible
interests, undermine the conclusion that the prevention of corruption is the
only interest that can overcome the First Amendment.
More recently, the Supreme Court has examined the constitutionality of
various state-level reforms."' Again, the prevention of corruption continues
to be the only acceptable reason for restricting political contributions or ex-
penditures.' In Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation,"' the
Court examined Colorado's laws regarding the ballot initiative process. 4
The Court applied Buckley's exacting scrutiny to requirements that groups
150. See CitizensAgainst Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 306-07 (White, J., dissenting) (noting
that Bellotti Court concluded that "[p]reserving the integrity of the electoral process" and pro-
moting "the individual citizen's confidence in government" were interests "of the highest im-
portance").
151. See infra note 153 (discussing Court's treatment of Colorado's restriction on ballot
initiative/referendum process in Buckley v. American ConsitutionalLaw Foundation, 525 U.S.
182 (1999)); see also supra notes 25-47 and accompanying text (examining Missouri's limits
on campaign contributions inNixon v. ShrinkMissouri GovernmentPAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000)).
152. See infra notes 153-54 and accompanying text (describing Supreme Court's applica-
tion of Buckley).
153. 525 U.S. 182 (1999). InACLl, the Supreme Court considered Colorado's regulation
of the state initiative/petition process. Id. at 186-87. First, the ACLF Court upheld the age
requirement for collectors, the six month limit on circulation, and the requirement that all
circulators sign an affidavit stating personal information, such as name and address, as measures
that protected the integrity of the initiative process and did not place undue burdens on political
communication. Id. at 191. The ACLF Court then threw out the requirement that petition
collectors be residents and registered voters of the state because it reduced the number of people
available to circulate petitions and, therefore, decreased the number of people that could be
reached with the group's message. Id. at 193-97. The ACLF Court also struck down the
requirement that petition circulators wear name badges because the state's interest in identifying
the circulators was accomplished by affidavit Id. at 197-200. The ACLF Court found that the
requirement that the petition circulators wear name badges discouraged people from collecting
signatures because of the threat of personal retaliation or harassment Id. at 198-200. This was
similar to a restriction against distributing anonymous handbills that the Court had previously
overturned. Id. The ACLF Court applied "exacting scrutiny" to the disclosure of how much
each circulator was paid. Id. at 201-04. The requirement that the initiative supporters report
how much they spent per signature was upheld as necessary to deter corruption through the
exposure of large expenditures. Id. at 202.
The requirement that the initiative supporters disclose the amounts paid to individual cir-
culators, however, was invalidated for two reasons. Id. at 203-04. First, the risk of corruption
was found to be lower during a petition drive than it is in a candidate election. Id. at 203.
Second, the assumption that a paid professional circulator, who has a professional reputation
to maintain, would be more likely than a passionate volunteer to produce false signatures was
unsubstantiated. Id. at203-04.
154. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182,186-205 (1999).
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soliciting signatures for petitions disclose the amount paid or owed to each
circulator. 5 Because the Court found that the possibility of quid pro quo was
not as likely in an initiative as it was in elections for office,"5' the Court
invalidated the regulation for its failure to prevent corruption 57
One of the most recent Supreme Court cases involving restrictions on
campaign activities was Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC. "a The
Court reiterated Buckley's distinction between limitations on contributions
and limitations on expenditures. 9 Citing Buckley, the Shrink PAC Court
declared that "a contribution limit involving 'significant interference' with
associational rights... could survive if the government demonstrated that
contribution regulation was 'closely drawn' to match a 'sufficiently important
interest."''16° The prevention of corruption was the only interest cited as meet-
ing this standard.1
61
Since Buckley, the standard for upholding campaign finance reforms trams
solely on whether the reform prevents corruption.16 Therefore, any future
campaign finance reform measure must prevent corruption in order to survive
current constitutional review' 6" Examination of current campaign reform
proposals shows why this standard may be problematic.
11. The Reformers: Perceived Problems and Proposed Solutions
Before analyzing the constitutionality ofthe reforms, one must first under-
stand their content. While there are many different reform proposals, this Note
155. See id. at 201-04 (examining Tenth Circuit's application of Buckley to uphold some,
but to reject other, disclosure provisions).
156. Id. at203.
157. See id. (explaining that corruption or appearance of corruption is less likely in ballot
initiatives than it is in candidate elections).
158. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000); see supra note 26 (discussing
facts of ShrinkPAC).
159. Shrink PAC, 528 U.S. at 386-87 (stating that limits on expenditures were restrictions
on direct speech while limits on conitributions were not).
160. Id. at 388-89 (citing Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam)). The
statement of the test is a reminder that the Buckley Court itself did not limit the possible gov-
ermental interests to the prevention ofcorruption. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per
curiam).
161. See Shrink PAC, 528 U.S. at 398 (citing string of cases in which restrictions were
upheld because they furthered government interest in prevention of corruption).
162. See supra notes 141-61 and accompanying text (chronicling campaign reform cases
that came after Buckley).
163. See supra notes 141-62 and accompanying text (explaining current standard for
upholding campaign finance reforms).
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will focus on proposals that ban soft money and restrict issue ads.'" As
representative examples of such reforms, this Note will discuss the soft money
ban and issue ad limits in the McCain-Feingold"65 and Shays-Meehan' bills. 67
A. The Perceived Problems
McCain and his supporters'" seek to ban soft money and certain forms
of issue advocacy. 69 Both of these campaign finance mechanisms are cre-
ations of the post-Buckley era. 7 Soft money and issue advocacy thrive
because the current standard of review gives these campaign finance methods
a First Amendment shield."'
1. SoftMoney
The term "soft money" refers to money raised and spent outside the scope
of FECA.7 It is money that FECA prohibits, either because of source or
amount, when contributed directly to a candidate, but that is allowed for other
purposes beyond the scope of FECA, such as state elections.'73 FECA created
164. See infra notes 168-95 and accompanying text (discussing perceived problems in
campaign finance system).
165. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2001, S. 27,107th Cong.
166. Bipartisan Campaign Finance ReformAct of2001, HR. 380,107th Cong.
167. See infra notes 196-222 and accompanying text (examining provisions of McCain-
Fcingold and Shays-Meehan campaign finance reform bills).
168. This Note will refer to those legislators and their supporters who advocate these
changes as "the reformers."
169. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2001, S. 27, 107th Cong (banning soft
money for political parties).
170. See infra notes 172-95 and accompanying text (describing rise of soft money and
issue ads).
171. See infra notes 229-67 and accompanying text (evaluating effect of current constitu-
tional standard on proposed reforms).
172. See L. PAIGE WHrAKM , CoNGREssIoNALREEARcH SERVicE, CAM:AIGNFINANCE:
CONSTrI'rIONAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF SOFT MONEY, ISSUE BRIEF 98025, at 1 (2001) (citing
Memorandum from Lawrence M. Nobel, General Counsel, FEC, to the Commissioners of the
FEC (June 6, 1997)) (defining soft money as funds prohibited by FECA because soft money
comes from prohibited source and exceeds contribution limits).
173. Soft money is money that is prohibited by FECA, such as donations from individuals
in excess of the aggregate limit for the election cycle and donations from corporations or unions.
Id. at 2. An example of soft money is money donated to a political party. Id. While FECA
restricts individual donors to $25,000 per year per political party, an individual can actually give
unlimited amounts to political parties, which the parties then can use for transfers to state and
local parties and other activities that are exempt from FECA"s requirements. See id. (discussing
political party soft money).
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soft money as we know it today in a 1979 advisory opinion.' The opinion
allowed a political party committee to spend money on get-out-the-vote
(GOTV) and voter registration drives without attributing the money against
the party's contribution limits for any named federal candidates.' 5 After the
Commission denied a public interest group's petition for rulemaking on soft
money, the public interest group, Common Cause, filed suit for judicial
review of the denial. 76 The district court required the Commission to promul-
gate regulations that are now the basis of the current soft money system.'"
The regulations provide for an elaborate system of allocating money for
certain committee expenses between federal and non-federal money."" Elec-
tion activities paid for through this system are exempt party-building activities
that affect both federal and non-federal activity and, therefore, can be paid for
with a mixture of federal and non-federal money. 9 Expenses that can be paid
for with soft money include the following: overhead expenses, generic voter
registration and GOTV drives, issue advertising, and fundraising. ° The soft
The $25,000 ceiling on individual contributions to political parties in FECA limits the
amount of money that an individual can donate to a party's federal account. Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat 1263, § 101. Such money
is regulated by FECA and can be used by the party to influence federal elections. WHTAICE,
supra note 172, at 1. Non-federal funds, however, can be used for other purposes, such as
paying overhead costs or voter registration drives. Individuals, corporations and interest groups
can give parties unlimited amounts of money for such activities. See infra note 178 and ac-
companying text (describing activities for which soft money can be used). Soft money is also
used by corporations and labor unions for election-related activities that are not covered by
FECA. WHIRTAKER, supra note 172, at 3.
174. See Op. Fed. Election Comm'n No. 1978-10 [1976-1990 transfer binder] Fed. Elec-
tion Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH) 5340 (1978) (deciding that sample ballot exemption in 2 U.S.C.
§ 431(3)(5XE) and § 431(f)(4X0) allowed parties to pay for voter registration and GOTV drives
from money raised outside FECA's limits).
175. Id.
176. See Common Cause v. FEC, 692 F. Supp. 1391,1391-97 (D.D.C. 1987) (examining
refusal of FEC to adopt Common Cause's proposals about soft money as regulations).
177. See id. at 1397, 1402 (ordering FEC to reconsider petition for rulemaking); see also
11 C.F.R. § 106.5 (2001) (outlining allocation of expenses between federal and non-federal
activities).
178. Federal money is money that is used for federal elections and, therefore, raised under
the requirements of FECA. See WHTAKER, supra note 172, at 1 (discussing hard and soft
money); Press Release, Federal Election Commission, supra note 2 (defining hard money as
federal money and soft money as non-federal money). Non-federal money is money that is used
for activities that do not effect federal elections and, therefore, is not raised under FECA. See
Press Release, Federal Election Commission, supra note 2 (same).
179. See 11 C.F.R. § 106.5(aX2) (delineating activities that must follow section's alloca-
tion procedures).
180. See id. § 106.5(a)(2) (listing activities that can be paid for based on allocation of
federal and non-federal money).
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money system allows party committees who participate in both federal and
non-federal activities to raise money outside the normal limits of FECA for
the portion of the "exempt" expenses that can be financed with non-federal
dollars.18'
For example, the allocation for national party committees permits the
party committees to pay for exempt activities on a formula that allows for
60% of the funds to come from federal accounts in non-presidential years and
65% in presidential election years."8 For state and local parties, the allocation
is based on the "ballot composition method," which takes into account how
many federal versus non-federal candidates are on the ballot in a given elec-
tion year."s3 This formula allows states with few state-level candidates in a
given year to pay for more of their exempt activities with federal money than
a state that has the same number of federal candidates but more state candi-
dates."84 The reformers object to soft money because the expenses that can be
paid for with unlimited non-federal money can often be used to indirectly
influence federal elections."8 5 One way parties frequently spend soft money
is on issue advertisements."8 6
2. Issue Ads
In Buckley, the Supreme Court narrowly defined the kind of ads that
constituted "express advocacy" and, therefore, fell within the purview of
181. See generally id. § 106.5 (outlining system for allocating non-federal dollars to com-
bined federal/non-federal activity).
182. Id. § 106.5(b)(2)(i)-(ii).
183. See id. (explaining that state party federal versus non-federal allocation should be
"based on the ratio of federal offices expected on the ballot to total federal and non-federal
offices expected on the ballot in the next general election to be held in the committee's state or
geographic area").
184. For example, in their October quarterly reports to the FEC, the Republican Party of
Virginia and the Republican Party of Kentucky reportedly used 46% and 25% of federal dollars,
respectively. Republican Party of Virginia, Report of Receipts and Disbursements, October 15
Quarterly Report, available at http'/Ihemdonl.sdrde.com/egi-bin/fecimg/?20036254013+0
(Oct 13, 2000); Republican Party of Kentucky, Report of Receipts and Disbursements, October
15 Quarterly Report, available at http'//hemdonl.sdrdc.com/cgi-bin/fecimg/_20036192344+0
(Oct. 13, 2000). This difference, based on the ballot make-up in the two states, is accounted for
in the formula set out in the regulations. See generally 11 C.F.R. § 106.5 (2001) (detailing for-
mula for amount of federal and non-federal spending allowed).
185. 145 CONG. REc. H8181 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1999) (statement ofRep. Shays) (stating
that although it is unlawful for corporations, unions, and foreign nationals to contribute to
federal campaigns, it happens because of use of soft money).
186. In the 2000 election cycle, the national committees of the two major political parties
spent almost $162 million on issue ads. Jamieson, supra note 4, at 4. Party-spending accounted
for 32% of the total issue ad spending in 2000. Id.
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FECA.is The Buckley Court created a bright-line test- the ad must expressly
advocate the election or defeat of an identifiable candidate before it would be
subject to the limitations ofFECA.1'8 However, the Supreme Court did extend
"express advocacy" to include a newsletter that encouraged readers to "vote
pro-life" and then listed which candidates were considered pro-life candidates
because it was an "explicit directive" to vote for specific candidates." 9 Be-
cause advertisers can easily avoid the list of specific "magic words" set out in
Buckley, party committees, wealthy interest groups, and others can pay for
advertisements that talk about a candidate for federal office with money that
is not subject to the limits in FECA.19°
In 1995, the FEC promulgated regulations defining "express advocacy.1
191
These regulations included the magic words from Buckley, as well as other
specific phrases, such as, "support the Democratic nominee," "reject the in-
cumbent," "[name of candidate] in '94," "vote Pro-life" or "vote Pro-choice"
when accompanied by a list of candidates, or the use of a candidate's cam-
paign slogan. 92 The regulations went on to include communications that
"could only be interpreted by a reasonable person as containing advocacy of
the election or defeat of one or more clearly identified candidate(s)."' 93 How-
ever, the proposition behind this regulation has been challenged. 94 The
predominating view among the courts is that communications must contain
words of express advocacy in order to be regulated under FECA. 95
187. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976) (per curiam) (listing "magic
words"); see also supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text (discussing "magic words" given
in Buckley).
188. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52 (listing words that should appear in advertisements
in order for FECA to apply); see also supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text (discussing
Buckley Court's construction of communication "relative to a clearly identified candidate").
189. See also FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238,243,249 (1986) (conclud-
ing that "explicit directive" to vote for particular candidates constituted "express advocacy").
190. See Thomas & Bowman, supra note 95, at 33, 37-43 (discussing five different ads that
discussed specific candidates but were deemed issue speech because they did not contain any
"magic words").
191. 11 C.F.R. § 100.22 (2001).
192. Id. § 100.22(a).
193. Id. § 100.22(b).
194. See Me. Right to Life Comm. v. FEC, 914 F. Supp 8, 13 (D. Me. 1996), aff'd per
curiam, 98 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996), cert denied, 522 U.S. 810 (1997) (holding that FEC
exceeded its authority by including reasonable person standard).
195. See L.PAIGE WrAKER, CONGRESSONALRESEARCHSERVICE, CAMPAIGNFINANCE
REFORM:ALEGALANALYSiSOFIsSUEANDEXPRESSADVOCACY,REP.NO. 98-282,at4-5 (2001)
(explaining current application of express advocacy by Federal Circuit Courts); see also Me.
Right to Life Comm., 914 F. Supp. at 13 (invalidating reasonable person standard and conclud-
ing that Buckley's magic words constituted bright line test).
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B. The Reform Proposals
To combat the loopholes that the Court created in Buckley, the reformers
have proposed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2001 in the Senate and
the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2001 in the House." The
major goals of these proposals are to ban soft money and to limit issue ads."
To accomplish these goals, the bills limit the ability of the parties to raise
money outside the limits of FECA,re require increased disclosure for inde-
pendent expenditures,"9 and redefine "express advocacy."2'
1. Soft Money
In order to limit the ability of the parties to raise soft money, both bills
require that the national political parties only raise and spend money that
comes under the restraints of FECA. °1 The proposals completely bar all
national party committees from raising or spending any money that does not
fall under FECA, regardless of whether the money is used for federal or non-
federal activity.2"2 The bills also expand the definition of "federal election
activity" to include many activities carried on by state and local party commit-
tees that are currently paid for in part by non-federal money.2 0s Under these
196. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2001, S. 27, 107th Cong. (2001); Bipartisan
Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2001 HR. 380, 107th Cong. (2001). For purposes of this
discussion, the House bill will be referred to as "Shays/Meehan" and the Senate bill as "Mc-
Cain/Feingold."
197. See S. 27, § 101 (amending FECA to prohibit use of soft money by political parties);
HR. 380, § 101 (same); S. 27, § 201 (amending FECA to provide for increased disclosure
requirement for election-related communications); HR. 380, § 201(b) (amending FECA to
redefine "express advocacy" to include many communications that are now considered issue ads).
198. See S. 27, § 101(a) (prohibiting any national committees of political party from solic-
iting, spending or transferring any funds that are not subject to limits in FECA); HR. 380, § 101
(same); see also infra notes 201-09 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of McCain-
Feingold and Shays-Meehan bills that limit contributions and use of soft money).
199. See S. 27, § 201 (discussing disclosure requirements for campaign related advertise-
ments); see also infra notes 210-21 and accompanying text (examining McCain-Feingold bill's
provisions with respect to issue ads).
200. See H.R 380, § 201(b) (expanding definition of express advocacy); see also infra notes
216-21 and accompanying text (outlining definition of express advocacy in Shays-Meehan bill).
201. See S. 27, § 101(a) (prohibiting national party committees from soliciting, spending
or transferring any funds that are not subject to limits in FECA); HR. 380, § 101 (same).
202. S. 27,107th Cong. § 101(a) (2001); H.R. 380,107th Cong. § 101 (2001). This means
that the status of a national committee as such determines the restrictions placed upon it, as
opposed to the current system, which defines restrictions based on the type of funded activity.
203. See S. 27, § 101(b) (requiring use of federal money for following activities: voter
registration drives held 120 days or less before any federal election; voter identification, GOTV
drives or any activity promoting political party for any election when federal office appears on
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bills, "excluded activity" would include only campaign activities by a state or
local political committee on behalf of state or local candidates, contributions
to state and local candidates, the costs of local political conventions, the cost
of campaign materials such as signs and bumper stickers that contain only
names of state or local candidates, and the costs of office construction or
purchase. 2 These provisions restrict the ability of state and local political
parties to raise or spend money outside FECA's limits, even on communica-
tions that do not affect federal elections.
25
The bills limit the ability of political parties to pay for fundraising activ-
ities using soft money." 6 The proposals prohibit the use of soft money to pay
for any fundraising activity by any party committee that raises funds to be
used for federal election activity.2 °7 The reforms would also prohibit parties
from making contributions to tax exempt organizations, other than political
committees that are subject to the provisions of FECA.2's Finally, the bills
would prohibit candidates for federal office, officeholders, or entities con-
trolled by such candidates or officeholders from raising or spending soft
money in connection with federal, state or local elections.2°
2. Issue Ads
Although the two bills have an identical approach to soft money, they
have very different approaches to issue ads.210  The McCain-Feingold bill
increases the disclosure requirements for electioneering communications.2
ballot; any communication that refers to candidate for federal office and is made for purpose of
influencing federal election regardless of whether communication constitutes express advocacy,
and any services provided by employees who spend more than 25% of their time working on
federal election activities); HRL 380, § 101 (same).
204. S. 27, § 101(b); H.R. 380, § 101.
205. See S. 27, § 101(b) (limiting use of federal money); R.R. 380, § 101 (same); see also
supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text (discussing Buckley Court's conclusion that only
expenditures that could be limited were expenditures on ads containing "magic words").
206. See S. 27, § 101(a) (requiring fundraising costs be paid with hard dollars unless
money raised will be used exclusively for non-federal activities); H.R 380, § 101 (same).
207. S. 27,107th Cong. § 101(a) (2001); HR. 380,107th Cong. § 101 (2001).
208. See S. 27, § 101(a) (prohibiting party committees at all levels from donating to
§ 501(c) or § 527 organizations); H.R. 380, § 101 (same).
209. See S. 27, § 101(a) (restricting ability of candidates running for federal office or fed-
eral officeholders from raising or contributing soft money to candidates, campaigns or commit-
tees); H.R. 380, § 101 (same).
210. See S. 27, § 201 (increasing disclosure); HR. 380, § 201(b) (redefining express ad-
vocacy); see also infra notes 211-21 and accompanying text (describing how McCain-Feingold
requires disclosure while Shays-Meehan redefines issue advocacy).
211. See S. 27,107th Cong. § 201 (2001) (increasing disclosure requirements for election-
eering communications).
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The bill defines "electioneering communications" as any broadcast, cable or
satellite communication that (1) refers to a "clearly identified" federal candi-
date, (2) is made within sixty days before a general election for federal office
or within thirty days of a primary election, convention or caucus, and (3) is
made to an audience that includes potential voters.212 The bill also requires
any person or group that spends more than $10,000 on such communication
to file a special disclosure statement with the FEC within twenty-four hours
of the communication.213 McCain-Feingold prohibits the expenditure of labor
union or corporation treasury funds for electioneering communications.214
Furthermore, the bill requires that any organizations that accept contributions
from corporations or labor unions keep segregated accounts for individual and
corporate donations; electioneering communications can only be paid for out
of the individual donor account."'
Shays-Meehan takes a very different approach to the problem of issue
ads. Instead of merely requiring disclosure of issue ads, Shay-Meehan rede-
fines "express advocacy."" 6 Thus, the bill reclassifies many advertisements
that are now defined as issue advocacy and defines them as express ad-
vocacy." 7 This change in classification effectively requires advertisements
that can currently be paid for with soft money to be paid for with money
raised under the contribution limits of FECA." 8 The bill provides the follow-
212. Id. The bill provides an exception for communications that are independent or coordi-
nated expenditures under FECA or news communications. Id.
213. See id. (directing people or groups, including political committees, who make more
than $10,000 worth of electioneering communications per calendar year to file disclosures about
their communications with FEC). The statement must include the following: the name of the
person or group making the disbursements and any other entity with control over the disburse-
ment; the principal place of business of such person or group; the amount of each distribution
by that person or group that exceeds $200 and the identification of the recepient of the distribu-
tion; the election to which the communication pertains and the candidates in that election; and
the names and addresses of all contributors who contributed over $1,000 to the individual or
group. Id.
214. See id. § 203 (prohibiting corporations and labor unions from paying for electioneer-
ing communications out of corporation's or union's treasury funds). For purposes of § 203,
organizations that are organized under 26 U.S.C. § 501(oX4) and receive funds from "business
activities" are treated like corporations and cannot use treasury funds for electioneering
communications. Id.
215. See id. (restricting ability of non-profit organizations to use money contributed to
them by corporations or labor unions for electioneering communications).
216. See H.R. 380, 107th Cong. § 201(b) (2001) (redefining express advocacy to include
more than just Buckley "magic words").
217. Id.
218. See WHrTAKEIR, supra note 195 (explaining that language in Shays-Meehan would
require any ads falling within bill's definition of express advocacy to be subject to FECA's
limitations).
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ing three ways a communication can expressly advocate a position: (1) by
containing specific phrases like the Buckley magic words, such as, "[name of
candidate] for Congress," "re-elect [candidate]," or by including any saying
that "can have no reasonable meaning other than to advocate the election or
defeat of... clearly identified candidates;" (2) by referring to any candidate
in a paid radio or television advertisement within sixty days of an election; or
(3) by opposition to a candidate." 9 From this definition, the bill exempts
"voting guides," which are defined as communications in print form (or on the
Intemet) that discuss the voting record of a candidate without expressing clear
support or opposition of such candidate.' The effect of this definition is that
virtually all communications that mention a federal candidate must be paid for
by money raised under the FECA contribution limits.22
Notwithstanding whether or not one believes that either of these bills
provide an accurate solution to the loopholes in the current campaign finance
system, the proposals have one major problem. Under the standard articulated
in Buckley, and narrowed by its progeny, the bills may be unconstitutional.'m
Even if passed by Congress, the fate of McCain-Feingold or Shays-Meehan
will ultimately be determined by the test applied by the Supreme Court.
IV The Fate of the Reform Proposals
Although campaign finance reform has faced difficulties in Congress,
passing a reform bill may actually be the easy part.' Because of the current
standard of review, any reform proposal must prevent corruption in order to
be upheld.2 4 This Part addresses three issues. First, subpart A discusses how
the reforms would likely be struck down under the current standard.=s
Second, subpart B suggests how the current reforms might fare under the
different frameworks set out bythe Justices in Shrink PAC."6 Finally, subpart
C proposes that the Buckley Court did not hold that the only interest that could
219. HR. 380,§201(b).
220. Id.
221. See WHrrAKER, supra note 195 (explaining that Shays-Meehan definition of express
advocacy would require any ads falling within bill's definition of express advocacy to be subject
to FECA's limitations).
222. See infra notes 231-67 and accompanying text (examining constitutional problems
of reforms under Buckley).
223. See infra notes 231-67 and accompanying text (describing how purpose of reforms
may not meet prevention of corruption standard).
224. See supra notes 141-63 and accompanying text (detailing how prevention of corrup-
tion has become only interest able to justify restrictions on campaign finance).
225. See infra Part IVA (discussing reforms under current constitutional standard).
226. See infra Part V.B (questioning how reforms would fare under different frameworks
laid out in ShrinkPAC).
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justify restrictions on campaign finance was the prevention of corruption. 7
Subpart C then examines the interests that would pass the test articulated in
Buckley and firther determines which interests of those advanced by current
reforms will pass scrutiny under the Buckley standard."s
A. The Current Standard: Only the Prevention of Corruption
Because the prevention of corruption is the only possible interest that
allows a reform to pass constitutional scrutiny, the proposed reforms must
explain what corruption the reform is fighting. ' The Supreme Court has thus
far upheld the practice of using soft money for party-building and issue ads
and has also upheld the bright line "magic word" issue ad test over contentions
that restrictions would prevent corruption." ° However, evaluating the consti-
tutionality of the proposed reforms may not be an easy task.
1. Soft Money
The constitutionality of a soft money ban has been the subject of much
academic debate? 1 The argument in favor of constitutionality is that contri-
butions to parties should be viewed like contributions to candidates, which
could be restricted under Buckley. 1 2 For this argument to work, the Court
must find that limiting soft money prevents corruption in a way similar to the
prevention of corruption that justified the limitations on direct contributions
to candidates.3 The argument against constitutionality focuses on how the
reforms do not fall into the narrow definition of preventing corruption. 4
227. See infra Part IV.C (asserting that Buckley Court did not require that all reforms
prevent corruption).
228. See infra Part IV.C (looking at other "significant" interests).
229. See supra notes 141-63 and accompanying text (discussing how restrictions on cam-
paign finance must prevent corruption in order to pass constitutional scrutiny).
230. See supra notes 141-63 and accompanying text (describing how Supreme Court has
narrowed Buckley test to make prevention of corruption only governmental interest able to
overcome challenges to campaign finance reforms).
231. See infra notes 232-49 and accompanying text (chronicling major arguments for and
against constitutionality of reforms). Because the constitutionality of the proposed reforms is
not the focus of this Note, it will not examine all scholarship on the subject
232. See Richard Briffault, The Political Parties and Campaign Finance Reform, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 620, 657-59 (2000) (concluding that "dangers of undue influence" are found
in soft money as well as in direct contributions).
233. See supra notes 141-63 and accompanying text (describing how Supreme Court
required that reforms prevent corruption in order to be constitutional).
234. See infra notes 245-49 and accompanying text (outlining arguments against constitu-
tionality).
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Commentators who believe the reforms are constitutional have found the
requisite corruption in various ways.23 Some focus on the nature of soft
money, concluding that there are "dangers of undue influence implicit in the
process by which the soft money... is raised."2 6 Others try to analogize soft
money to other types of restrictions that the Supreme Court has deemed
unconstitutional. 7 The most important of these assertions of constitutional-
ity is contained in a letter written by Professors Ronald Dworkin and Burt
Neubome and signed by 126 legal scholars (the "letter").2
8
The letter argues that the Supreme Court's opinion in Austin v. Michi-
gan Chamber of Commerce,"9 in which the Court held that the state of Mich-
igan could prevent political contributions and expenditures from corporate
treasuries, supports the proposition that the ban on soft money would be
upheld.240 The letter concludes the following:
235. See infra notes 236-44 and accompanying text (examining how proponents of consti-
tutionality of reforms find requisite government interest).
236. Briffault, supra note 232, at 659.
237. See Daniel M. Yarmish, Note, The ConstitutionalBasisfor a Ban on SoftMoney, 67
FORDHAM L. REv. 1257, 1273-76 (1998) (arguing that soft money could be banned). For
example, Yarmish argues that upholding limits on soft money is analogous to the contribution
limitations on political committees. Id. at 1274. However, the limits upheld by the Court in
Buckley are limits that disallow an individual from contributing more that $5,000 to a political
party for federal campaign activity. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 35-37 (1976) (per curiam).
Unlike direct contributions, soft money is not being contributed expressly for the purpose of
influencing a federal campaign. See supra notes 172-86 and accompanying text (describing defi-
nition and uses of soft money). When the money is instead going to a voter registration drive,
which may incidentally promote a federal candidate along with other candidates, the Court has
not allowed restrictions on contributions for the non-federal allocation. See supra notes 170-84
and accompanying text (describing way soft money is used as opposed to hard money).
Another analogy made is one between soft money and corporate funds. See Yarmish,
supra, at 1274-75 (stating that Court's decision to uphold state ban on corporate funds in elec-
tions is evidence that soft money contributions can also be limited); see also Letter from Pro-
fessors Ronald Dworkin & Burt Neubome, to Senators John McCain & Russell Feingold
(Sept. 22,1997), available athttp/www.brennancenter.orgresources/downloads/softnoney.pdf
[hereinafter Dworkin & Neuborne, Letter] (arguing that ability to limit contributions to candi-
dates must mean contributions to parties may also be limited). The Court has upheld complete
bans on corporate funds; however, the Court was clear that these determinations were made
because of the historical attitude that money from corporations to candidates, rather than to
parties for non-federal uses, was potentially corrupting. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Com-
merce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (looking at Court's determination that historical view of corporate
donations to candidates was corrupting).
238. Dworkin & Neuborne, Letter, supra note 237.
239. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
240. See Dworkin & Neubome, Letter, supra note 237, at 2 (concluding thatAustin allows
Congress to restrict "source and size" of contributions to parties). InAustin v. Michigan Cham-
ber ofCommerce,494 U.S. 652 (1990), the Court considered the constitutionality of a Michigan
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[s]urely, the law cannot be that Congress has the power to prevent
corporations from giving money directly to a candidate, or from
expending money on behalf of a candidate, but lacks the power to
preventthemfrompouring unlimitedffunds into acandidate'spolit-
ical party inorderto buypreferred access to him afterthe election.Y'
The letter also notes that Congress's ability to limit donations from corpora-
tions and unions to candidates supports its ability to limit contributions to
parties as well.242 The problem with Dworkin's and Neubome's analogy,
however, is that the funds at issue in Austin were for contributions and expen-
ditures by a corporation that expressly advocated a candidate.24 Soft money,
on the other hand, does not pay for direct contributions, but for general
campaign activity, which has been distinguished from direct contributions.2 44
statute that prohibited corporations from using treasury funds for contributions or independent
expenditures in support of, or in opposition to, a candidate for state office. Id. at 655. The
Michigan Chamber of Commerce (Chamber), a not-for-profit corporation, wished to purchase
a newspaper advertisement in support of a specific candidate. Id. at 656. Although the Cham-
ber had a segregated account for political funds, the Chamber wished to pay for the ads out of
its general treasury. Id. Because the Michigan statute at issue made such an act a felony, the
Chamber challenged the constitutionality of the statute under the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. Id. The Court determined that the statute restricted the corporations ability to use its
funds for political activity. Id. at 658. The government's interest in preventing corruption or
the appearance of corruption, however, justified this restriction on the corporation's speech.
Id. at 659-60. The Court concluded that the special nature of the corporate form justified the
restrictions. Id. at 660.
The Court also determined that the statute was narrowly tailored because it eliminated the
evil of money from corporate treasuries while still allowing corporations to participate in
elections through segregated funds. Id. at 660-61. Next, the Court decided that the statute
could be constitutionally applied to the Chamber because, although it was a non-profit, its pur-
pose was not tied to political goals and it was easily influenced by business corporations. Id.
at 661-65. The Court rejected the contention that the statute was underinclusive because it did
not include unincorporated labor unions. Id. at 655-66. The Court reasoned that the state's
justification in including only corporations was based on the special benefits given to the corpo-
rate form and, therefore, the exclusion of unincorporated groups was acceptable. Id.
The Court also rejected a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to the statute's exemption for
media corporations. Id. at 666-68. The exemption, the Court concluded, was necessary to
ensure that the media served the public by reporting political activities. Id. at 668. Finally, the
Court held that the Michigan statute was constitutional. Id. at 668-69.
241. Dworkin & Neubome, Letter, supra note 237, at 3.
242. See id. (stating that "closing the loophole for soft monej contributions is in line with
the longstanding and constitutional ban on corporate and union contributions in federal elec-
tions").
243. SeeAusfin, 494 U.S. at 655 (stating that Michigan law at issue prohibited corporations
from using treasury funds for contributions and independent expenditures).
244. See supra notes 172-86 and accompanying text (describing differences between soft
money, which pays for general activity, and hard money, which can pay for express advocacy).
58 WASH. &LEEL. REV 1109 (2001)
Thus, Austin does not speak directly to the issue of soft money because soft
money is frequently used to pay for issue ads and similar communications that
do not contain express advocacy.
Those who believe that soft money would be deemed unconstitu-
tional under the Buckley framework criticize the letter.24s One of the leading
critics of the soft money ban, FEC Commissioner Bradley Smith, asserts
that the letter incorrectly "focus[ed] only on the sources and not the uses
of soft money." 46 Smith argues that the ability of parties to raise soft money
to spend on such things as issue ads cannot be unconstitutional because
the contribution is made not to the candidates - who are officeholders and
are therefore able to be corrupted - but to the parties.247 As for the proposi-
tion that Austin supports a soft money ban, Smith notes that Austin only
addresses the context of express advocacy, on which the Supreme Court
previously allowed limitations."' No matter the position of the commentator,
all agree that the applicable standard is whether or not the restriction prevents
corruption.
249
245. See infia notes 246-48 (discussing why soft money ban may not be constitutional);
see also Arthur N. Eisenberg, Civic Discourse, Campaign Finance Reform and the Virtues of
Moderation, 12 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LnTERATEJRE 141 (2000) (describing how ban on soft
money would not be constitutional under Buckley).
246. Bradley A. Smith, SoftMoney, Hard Realities: The Constitutional Prohibition on a
Soft MoneyBan., 24 .LEOS. 179, 180 n.10 (1998).
247. See id. at 197 (wondering, "[b]ut what does it mean to say that a party is corrupted?").
Smith rejects the idea that contributions could be banned because a candidate may feel an obli-
gation to his or her political party. See id. (declaring that limiting contributions to parties
because candidates may feel that they have obligation to their party "would be to undercut the
entire rationale behind Buckley and its progeny").
248. See id. at 197-98 (pointing out that bothAustin and Bellotti concerned ban on use of
corporate general funds, but ban on spending such funds on express advocacy in Austin was
upheld, while Court struck down ban on issue ads in Bellont). Smith does concede, however,
that it may be constitutional to ban soft money for voter registration drives and GOTV activities
if the communications include advocacy of specific candidates. See id. at 199-200 (noting that
such activity could probably be banned because it engages in express activity, however, "it may
be hard to classify a voter registration or get-out-the-vote drive as 'express advocacy,' if it is
done without any urging to vote in a specific manner").
249. See id. at 184 (declaring that Buckley held that "only the compelling state interest in
preventing quid pro quo corruption of officeholders and candidates could justify" regulation of
campaign contributions and expenditures); Briffault, supra note 232, at 657-58 (observing that
"soft money can be regulated if it presents a danger of corruption or the appearance of corrup-
tion"); Dworkin & Neubome, Letter, supra note 237, at 2 (concluding that Buckley "held that
the government has a compelling interest in combating the appearance and reality of corruption,
an interest that justifies restricting large campaign contributions in federal elections"); Yarmish,
supra note 237, at 1271 (asserting that "the Court has held that preventing corruption or its
appearance are the only justifications for limiting election-related contributions").
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2. Issue Ads
Although the case for banning soft money may have some hope of pass-
ing constitutional review under the Buckley regime, the case for banning issue
advocacy is not as encouraging." As discussed above, the McCain-Feingold
and Shays-Meehan bills take different approaches to the problem of issue
advocacy." The Shays-Meehan solution is to redefine express advocacy to
include many ads that are now considered issue ads, thereby subjecting them
to the requirements of FECA."2
The academic community also has discussed the constitutionality of a
ban on issue ads.' The general consensus is that any attempt to restrict issue
ads faces major constitutional problems under the Buckley regime and that the
Court would not uphold an outright ban.' The solution that is most likely to
250. See infra notes 253-66 and accompanying text (describing opinions of commentators
about constitutionality of ban on issue advocacy).
251. See supra notes 210-21 and accompanying text (discussing differences between Me-
Cain-Feingold and Shays-Meehan provisions for issue ads).
252. See supra notes 216-21 and accompanying text (explaining how Shays-Meehan re-
defines issue advocacy).
253. See infra notes 254-66 and accompanying text (looking at commentary on constitu-
tionality of issue ad ban).
254. See Lilian R. BeVier, The Issue ofIssueAdvocacy: An Economic, Political, and Con-
stitutionalAnaysis, 85 VA. L. REv. 1761, 1773-74 (1999) (defining Buckey's holding as '"hat
the First Amendment unequivocally protects the right to make unrestricted, unlimited, and even
unwise expenditures on other kinds of political advocacy, including the right to mention
candidates by name and even clearly if implicitly to endorse their election or urge their defeat");
Lillian R. BeVier, Mandatory Disclosure, "Sham Issue Advocacy," and Buckley v. Valeo: A
Response to Professor Hasen, 48 UCLA L. REV. 285, 297 (2000) [hereinafter BeVier, A
Response to Professor Hasen] (concluding that "[tihe only distinction the Court explicitly drew
in Buckley v. Valeo was that between a narrow category of independent expenditures on express,
'magic word' advocacy... and independent expenditures on other types of political, election-
related speech, which could neither be limited in amount nor subjected to disclosure require-
ments"); Richard A. Davey, Jr., Note, "Buckleying" the System: Is Meaningful Campaign
Finance Reform Possible UnderReigningFirstAmendmentJurisprudence?, 34 GONZ. L. REV.
509, 523-24 (1999) (declaring that "[u]ltimately... current proposed reforms are likely to fail.
Any attempt for meaningful legislation necessarily requires the restriction of issue advocacy
which would almost certainly be ruled unconstitutional"); Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly
Complex Case for Disclosure of Contributions and Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advo-
cacy, 48 UCLA L. REV. 265, 268 (2000) (stating that "[d]iselosure laws have the best chance
of passing constitutional muster if they contain clear standards for disclosure that are not overly
burdensome. Even such laws, however, run a risk ofunconstitutionality on overbreadth grounds
because they will regulate some speech that is not unambiguously related to the election."). For
arguments that Buckley itself was wrongly decided and that reforms should be upheld under a
different standard, see Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94
COLUM. L. Rnv. 1390,1413 (1994) (arguing that Buckley "is the modem analogue toLochner
v. New York, offering an adventurous interpretation of the Constitution so as to invalidate a
redistributive measure having and deserving broad democratic support").
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pass constitutional scrutiny, according to commentators, is a disclosure pro-
vision, like the one in McCain-Feingold. 5 However, there is disagreement
about whether Congress can even require disclosure. 6
One commentator contends that the two major obstacles preventing
disclosure of issue advocacy are vagueness and overbreadth.' 7 Professor
Hasen argues that a statute can be narrowly written to avoid the vagueness
problem, but that it is difficult to draft a statute that overcomes the over-
breadth problem." He concludes that a disclosure law may be constitutional
if it has a sufficiently short period for reporting and a high monetary thresh-
old. 9 This conclusion follows from the assumption that the likelihood of an
advertisement, at a high monetary threshold, that mentions a candidate in a
limited time period right before an election and does not seek to influence the
election, is small and that expenditures that seek to influence an election can
be regulated.2"c Thus, the disclosure requirements of McCain-Feingold may
be upheld because of the high monetary threshold for disclosure.26'
Other commentators assert that not even disclosure provisions would be
allowed under Buckley.262 This view rejects the assumption that the Court
would allow regulation of ads with the purpose of effecting a federal elec-
tion.263 Proponents of the notion that required disclosure is unconstitutional
contend that the Court will allow regulation only for those ads that implicate
the interest in preventing corruption; ads that are not coordinated with the
candidate cannot implicate that interest.
2
6
255. See Hasen, supra note 254, at 268 (noting that disclosure law is type of regulation that
is most likely to withstand constitutional scrutiny).
256. .See infra notes 257-64 and accompanying text (presenting arguments for and against
constitutionality of disclosure).
257. See Hasen, supra note 254, at 268-69 (stating that to overcome Buckley, regulations
must "contain clear standards for disclosure that are not overly burdensome" and "minimize the
overbreadth problem").
258. See id. at 269 (concluding that narrow statutes still may have overbreadth problems).
259. Id. at 283.
260. See id. at 281-82 (observing that "[ilt is hard to think of prominent real world exam-
ples of such speech").
261. See id. at 282-83 (deciding that high monetary threshold makes McCain-Feingold
"stand []a greater chance of surviving constitutional scrutiny"). McCain-Feingold only requires
disclosure of expenditures over $10,000. S. 27, 107th Cong. § 210 (2001).
262. See BeVier,A Response to Professor Hasen, supra note 254, at 304 (concluding that
Buckley "simply did not hold that the First Amendment offers less protection to election-related
speech than to other political speech").
263. See id. at 290 (asserting that "[a]dvocacy of the election or defeat of candidates for
federal office is no less entitled to protection under the First Amendment than the discussion
of political policy generally") (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28 (1976) (per curiam)).
264. See id. at 295-96 (noting that Court intended that only campaign-related speech,
meaning speech that is made in coordination with particular campaign, could be regulated).
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Whether or not mere disclosure would be unconstitutional, it is clear that
the current standard would not allow for the Shays-Meehan approach.' 5 As
explained above, Shays-Meehan redefines express advocacy to require all ads
that mention a candidate within sixty days before an election be paid for with
hard dollars. 26 Given the current standard set out in Buckley and its progeny,
that the prevention of corruption is the only interest that would justify restric-
tion of election-related contributions and expenditures, the outlook for the
current reforms seems bleak.267 However, this grim prediction only applies if
the Supreme Court reviews the reforms under the current standard. If the
Court should decide that preventing corruption is not the only interest suffi-
cient to overcome constitutional scrutiny, there may be some hope for the
current reforms.
B. A New Standard: Suggestions from Shrink PAC
This Note contends that preventing quid pro quo corruption is notthe only
government interest significant enough to allow campaign finance reform. The
current Court's frustrationwithBuckley, as interpreted by its progeny, supports
this contention." This subpart discusses the alternative frameworks discussed
in Shrink PAC and how each might treat the reform proposals.269
1. Money Is Not Speech - Justice Stevens's Approach
Justice Stevens suggested that restrictions on the amount of money con-
tributed to or spent on election activities should not be classified as restric-
tions on speech, but rather as restrictions on the use of property."' He stated
that the Constitution protects people against government regulation pertaining
to the use of their property, but that those protections are unrelated to the First
Amendment."' A property-based standard does not, however, guarantee the
265. See supra note 254 (reciting views of commentators stating that ban on issue ads is
unconstitutional).
266. See supra notes 216-21 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of Shays-
Meehan).
267. See supra notes 231-66 and accompanying text (explaining why current reform pro-
posals may be held unconstitutional).
268. See infra notes 270-300 and accompanying text (examining suggested frameworks
in ShrinkPAC and discussing how each framework would treat interests other than prevention
of corruption).
269. See infra notes 270-300 and accompanying text (discussing opinions in ShrinkPAC).
270. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 337, 398 (2000) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) (stating that "[m]oney is property, it is not speech"); see also supra notes 28-35 and
accompanying text (outlining Justice Stevens's dissent).
271. See id. at 399 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Telling a grandmother that she may not use
her own property to provide shelter to a grandchild - or to hire mercenaries to work in that
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approval of the reform proposals. Although Justice Stevens did not explain
exactly what standard would apply, he did point out that the expenditure limits
struck down in Buckley would likewise fail a property analysis.272 If the con-
tribution/expenditure distinction remains under a property regime, it is possi-
ble that issue advocacy cannot be regulated because it is an expenditure as
opposed to a contribution. 3 However, soft money is a contribution; there-
fore, the Court may uphold a soft money ban under Justice Stevens's frame-
work because the due process regime may allow for the advancement of other
governmental interests. Because the prevention of corruption would not be
the sole governmental interest allowing for regulation, reforms such as a soft
money ban are more likely to survive the Court's scrutiny.274 The likelihood
of survival is increased because the government would be able to advance other
interests, such as the interest in equalizing the ability ofindividuals and groups
to influence campaigns, which was rejected on First Amendment grounds in
Buckley.275  Thus, Justice Stevens would not require reforms to serve the
prevention of corruption interest in order to survive constitutional review.
2. Balance and Defer - Justice Breyer's Approach
Justice Breyer suggested that the review of campaign finance restrictions
implicates two protected interests that require balancing.276 He believed that
grandchild's campaign for public office - raises important constitutional concerns that are
unrelated to the First Amendment").
272. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that because he did not participate in Bucley,
he was unable to suggest that property and liberty concerns implicated by restrictions on
property would allow for invalidation of expenditure limits).
273. See id. (arguing that Buckley Court could have justified striking down expenditure
limits based on due process arguments).
274. See supra notes 231-67 and accompanying text (describing how prevention of corrup-
tion standard may prevent reforms from being constitutional).
275. See supra notes 231-67 and accompanying text (discussing how reforms may not be
possible because they do not directly prevent quid pro quo corruption). However, this approach
may not be the best analytic fit for regulations of campaign finance. Although it is true that
money is being restricted, it is difficult to ignore the speech and association interests that are
implicated in the action of donating and spending money for political communication. A purely
property-based analysis would ignore the special character of political money, in that the very
expenditure of such money is an act that implicates some FirstAmendment rights. See Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam) (asserting that "contribution and expenditure lim-
itations operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities"). For a more
detailed analysis of the property versus speech question, see generally Spencer A. Overton,
Mistaken Identity: Unveilingthe Property Characteristics ofPoliical Money, 53 VAND. L. REV.
1235 (2000) (arguing that political money has many characteristics of property as well as of
speech, and that appropriate test for campaign finance reforms would embody principals from
both speech and property analyses).
276. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377,400 (2000) (Breyer, J., concur-
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the Court should weigh both the interest in protecting speech and the interest
in protecting the integrity of elections? 7 Justice Breyer criticized those
Justices who believed that restrictions on campaign finance should be subject
to strict scrutiny?28 He likened the application of strict scrutiny to a presump-
tion against the constitutionality of campaign finance restrictions. 9 Given
the competing interests, he concluded that such a presumption was "out of
place.
"1 °o
Instead, Justice Breyer proposed asking "whether the statute burdens any
one such interest in a manner out of proportion to the statute's salutary effects
upon the others.""1 To assist the Court in balancing the interests at stake,
Justice Breyer advocated deferring to legislative judgment.28 However, he
quickly explained that the Court should still carefully review campaign
finance provisions for other "constitutional evils," such as provisions that may
unfairly protect incumbents.2?8
To apply Breyer's framework to a soft money ban, the Court would need
to balance the rights of the parties and contributors against the government's
interest in preserving the integrity of elections. The interest in preserving the
integrity of elections is a broader interest than the current prevention of
corruption standard and implicates more than just quid pro quo situations. 4
If there were legislative findings that a soft money ban would protect the
integrity of elections, Justice Breyer's test would allow such a ban to stand."8
The same may be said for issue advocacy. Although the speech implications
may be greater in the context of issue ads, the broader interest of assuring
integrity may overcome the major problem inherent in the Buckle, frame-
ring) (declaring that "this is a case where constitutionally protected interests lie on both sides
of the legal equation"); see also supra notes 36-40 (discussing Breyer's concurring opinion).
277. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring) (concluding that "mechanical application" of strict
scrutiny cannot "properly resolve the difficult constitutional problem that campaign finance
statutes pose").
278. See id. at 399 (Breyer, J., concurring) (denying that failure to adopt strict scrutiny
standard disregards First Amendment rights).
279. Id. at 400 (Breyer, J., concurring).
280. Id. at 401 (Breyer, J., concurring).
281. IRL at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring).
282. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring) (opining that legislature has more expertise than Court
to determine what actions threaten integrity of elections).
283. Id. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring).
284. See id. at 401 (Breyer, 3., concurring) (referring to safeguarding of electoral process
rather than to prevention of corruption of individual candidates).
285. See id. at 402 (arguing that courts should defer to legislature's judgment in matters
like "the field of election regulation" where legislators have "significantly greater institutional
expertise" than courts).
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work, that where there is no direct quid pro quo, the government cannot regu-
late."s Thus, Justice Breyer's balancing standard may also uphold reforms
that do not explicitly serve the prevention of corruption interest.
3. Strict Scrutiny - Justice Kennedy's and Justice Thomas's Approach
Rather than propose tests that would allow for more restrictions on cam-
paign finance, Justices Kennedy and Thomas advocated strengthening the
standard to protect the First Amendment rights implicated by such restric-
tions.2" Justice Kennedy did not precisely define the applicable standard of
review, but he claimed that the contribution limit at issue in Shrink PAC did
not "come even close to passing any serious scrutiny."" 5 He said there may
be room for Congress to reform the system in a different way than in FECA,
but he questioned whether any restriction on direct contributions and expendi-
tures could be so limited." 9 Finally, Justice Kennedy conceded that at the end
of the day he would likely side with Justice Thomas, who supported strict
scrutiny of restrictions on campaign financing.'
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, contended that "[p]olitical
speech is the primary object of First Amendment protection"'" and that con-
tribution limits directly burdened this most fundamental right.' He argued
thatBuckley discounted the rights ofboth candidates and contributors by allow-
ing restrictions on campaign contributions. 3 Because Buckley restricted the
First Amendment rights of candidates and contributors, he would overrule it. s4
He believed that such restrictions must be reviewed under strict scrutiny.' 5
Justice Thomas rejected the notion that the prevention of corruption will
286. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (per curiam) (discussing interest in prevent-
ing corruption in terms of preventing quid pro quo arrangements).
287. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377,412 (2000) (Thomas, 3., dissent-
ing) (declaring that contribution limits should be "met with the utmost skepticism and should
receive the strictest scrutiny"); see also supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text (describing
standards offered by Justices Kennedy and Thomas).
288. Id. at 410 (Kennedy, I., dissenting).
289. See id. at 409-10 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (declaring that he would "overrule
Buckley and then free Congress or state legislatures to attempt some new reform, if, based upon
their own considered view of the First Amendment, it is possible to do so").
290. Id. at 409 (Kennedy, 3., dissenting).
291. Id. at410 (Thomas, 3., dissenting).
292. See id. at 412 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (announcing that "contribution caps, which
place a direct and substantial limit on core speech, should be met with the upmost skepticism
and should receive the strictest scrutiny").
293. Id. at 418 (Thomas, 3., dissenting).
294. Id. at 410 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
295. Id. at 412 (Thomas, 3., dissenting).
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always be a sufficient interest to overcome constitutional review. 6 Applying
this standard to the current reform proposals, few would survive strict scrutiny.
If a donor's ability to make unrestricted contributions to candidates could not
be limited, then donations that are one step removed from the candidate, like
soft money, surely would be allowed. The same could be said for issue advo-
cacy. If giving an unlimited amount ofmoneyto a candidate would be permit-
ted, it seems unlikely that Justice Thomas would restrict an individual's ability
to spend money on advertisements that do not even expressly advocate the
election of that same candidate. If an advertisement does not advocate the
election or defeat of a candidate, even if it has the purpose of doing so, then this
action is still far removed from giving the same amount of money to a candi-
date, which would be legal under Justice Thomas's standard.' 7
However, because Justice Thomas believed that disclosure was a less
restrictive means of preventing corruption," the disclosure provisions may
still stand under his strict scrutiny analysis.' 9 Nevertheless, under Justice
Thomas's standard, the interest in preventing corruption may be overcome by
the interest of the speaker if the means chosen by the government are not
narrowly tailored."° He reasoned that the donation is not for a candidate
and, therefore, does not pose as great a threat as direct contributions to candi-
dates. Thus, Justice Thomas's framework may restrict the ability for virtually
any reform, even those that prevent corruption, from passing constitutional
scrutiny.
C. A New Standard: Buckley Revisited
The Buckley Court did not hold that the only interest that could justify
restrictions on campaign finance was the prevention of corruption." 1 Justice
White argued this point in the cases following Buckley and this Note argues
296. See id. at 429 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (asserting that "when it comes to a significant
infringement on our fundamental liberties, that some undesirable conduct may not be deterred
is an insufficient justification to sweep in vast amounts of protected political speech"). Justice
Thomas offers the example of bribery statutes as provisions that precisely address the interest
in preventing quid pro quo corruption. Id. at 428 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
297. See id. at 412 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (asserting that "[w]hat remains of Buckley fails
to provide an adequate justification for limiting individual contributions to political candidates").
298. Id. at 428 (Thomas, 3., dissenting).
299. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (asserting that disclosure laws are effective means for
deterring corruption).
300. See id. at 427 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining that limitations must advance com-
pelling governmental interest and be narrowly tailored to pass strict scrutiny).
301. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976) (per curiam) (asserting merely that it
was "unnecessary" to look at other interests in Buckley because that was primary interest of
FECA).
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it now." Admittedly, the Supreme Court, as well as lower courts, frequently
assert that Buckley stood for the fhct that preventing corruption is the only
significant interest.' 30 However, the Court in Buckley did not claim to create
such a rigid standard .30 The Buckley Court merely stated that it was "unnec-
essary to look beyond the Act's primary purpose," which was prevention of
corruption. 3 5  The standard established in Buckley was one of "exacting
scrutiny."13°6 Although the Buckley Court did not spell out exactly what this
"exacting scrutiny" required, in discussing the contribution limits, the Court
stated that the government must "demonstrate[ ] a sufficiently important inter-
est" and "closely drawn" means .' The Justices never asserted that the pre-
vention of corruption was the only interest that would allow restrictions on
campaign finance s As noted above, the idea that Buckley stood for the
principle that the only available interest to justify campaign finance reforms
is the prevention of corruption was an idea advocated only after Buckley.' °
As Justice White correctly pointed out, the Supreme Court narrowed the
ability of campaign finance reforms to pass constitutional scrutiny by limiting
the available interests that a government can promote with such restrictions.10
In emphasizing quid pro quo corruption, the Court disallowed reforms when
the purpose was more general, such as preserving the integrity of elections.
311
302. See Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 306 (1981)
(White, J., dissenting) (explaining that Court in Buckley did not think it necessary to consider
other interests in that case, not that Buckley Court believed that other interests were precluded).
303. See supra notes 141-62 and accompanying text (discussing cases asserting that Buck-
ley required reforms to prevent corruption).
304. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26 (stating simply that "[it is unnecessary" to look at inter-
ests other than prevention of corruption to uphold restrictions on contributions).
305. See CitizensAgainstRentConfrol, 454 U.S. 290 at:306 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26).
306. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16 (describing how First Amendment requires "exacting
scrutiny"); id. at 44-45 (stating that expenditure limitations must survive "exacting scrutiny
applicable to limitations on core First Amendment rights of political expression"); id. at 64
(asserting that limits on First Amendment rights implicated by disclosure provisions must
survive "exacting scrutiny").
307. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam).
308. See id. at 26 (finding it unnecessary to consider interests other than prevention of
corruption). However, the Court did explicitly reject some interests as not satisfying the stan-
dard of exacting scrutiny. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text (noting Court's rejec-
tion of other asserted interests in expenditure limits).
309. See supra notes 141-63 and accompanying text (describing how subsequent cases
narrowed Buckley's holding).
310. See supra notes 141-63 and accompanying text (discussing how subsequent cases
narrowed Buckley's holding).
311. See supra notes 141-63 and accompanying text (noting how subsequent cases
narrowed Buckly's holding).
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While the Court's stated concern in upholding this narrow construction of the
available interests was the First Amendment protection of political speech, the
unintended consequence of this determination may be the inability of legisla-
tors to prevent more general harms to the electoral system."12 If the Court
were to apply the test for campaign finance reforms as broadly as originally
stated in Buckley, the reforms would have a better chance of passing constitu-
tional scrutiny. For example, if the Court recognizes a more general interest
in protecting the integrity of elections, campaign finance reform proposals
could restrict activities that do not implicate a direct quid pro quo situation,
but nonetheless influence the election of federal candidates.
As explained, Buckley requires a sufficiently important interest includ-
ing, but not limited to, the prevention of corruption. However, this interest
does not encompass the desire to equalize speakers economically.3 1 3 In the
context of the disclosure provisions, the Court concluded that three different
interests survived "strict scrutiny."314 The Court could evaluate a ban on soft
money and restrictions on issue ads under the "exacting scrutiny" standard
from Buckley, while allowing the government to assert more interests than just
prevention of corruption. The government interest in preventing the impres-
sion in the minds of voters that offices are being bought is certainly a "suffi-
ciently important government interest." 315 All ofthe reforms further this inter-
est. A soft money ban, for example, could prevent the perception that corpo-
rations, unions, and wealthy individuals can "buy" elections by preventing
them from giving unlimited amounts of money to political parties. However,
a significant interest alone is not enough.16 The reform must also accomplish
312. See Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981)
(discussing importance of freedom of association); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S.
377,406 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (urging Court to "face up to adverse, unintended con-
sequences" created by Buckley and its progeny that allow "covert speech").
313. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (describing test laid out in Buckley).
314. See Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 66, 68-69 (per curiam) (describing interest in pro-
viding electorate with information about money going in and out of campaigns in order to better
evaluate candidates, interest in preventing corruption, and interest in gathering information that
may uncover violations of election law).
315. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 403-04 (2000) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (concluding that Court should "defer to [the legislature's] political judgement that
unlimited spending threatens the integrity of the electoral process"). The Austin Court quietly
endorsed this interest See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659-60
(1990) (concluding that "[riegardless of whether this danger of 'financial quid pro quo' corrup-
tion, [citations omitted], may be sufficient to justify a restriction on independent expenditures,
Michigan's regulation aims at a different type of corruption in the political arena: the corrosive
and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of
the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's support for the corpora-
tion's political ideas").
316. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25 (requiring that means be "closely drawn").
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its goal by "closely drawn means." '17 In this case, one could argue that the
reform is closely drawn because although it restricts soft money, the perceived
evil, it does not completely ban contributions to political parties. This view
looks like a balancing test - weighing the speaker/donor's strong interest in
First Amendment rights against the governmental interest in eliminating the
perception that public offices are for sale. The Court would then determine
whether the reform burdened either interest more than necessary.
The current Court does not seem completely opposed to such a standard.
Although Shrink PAC was decided under Buckley, the plethora of frameworks
offered in the separate opinions suggests that several Justices are unhappy
with the prevention of corruption standard."' The majority, Justices Souter,
Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer, shied away from the
strict quid pro quo definition of corruption. 19 They claimed that the interest
in preventing corruption was larger than the bribery context and extended to
a more general concern with the influence of money on governmental ac-
tion.320 Although the Buckley Court intended to allow restrictions that encom-
passed more than outright bribery, the Court mentioned only quid pro quo
situations.321 This hint of the ShrinkPAC majority's dissatisfactionmaybe an
indication that given the right facts, the Court will "lower" the standard to up-
hold regulations furthering different, although significant, government inter-
ests. A lower standard would allow regulation of soft money and issue ads
317. Id.
318. See supra notes 270-300 and accompanying text (discussing separate opinions in
ShrinkPAC).
319. See Shrink PAC, 528 U.S. at 389 (asserting that in addition to quid pro quo corrup-
tion, Buckley "recognized a concern not confined to bribery of public officials"). Furthermore,
in FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee, 121 S. Ct 2351 (2001), the
Court (with the same majority as in Shrink PAC) defines corruptions as "being understood
not only as quid pro quo arrangements, but also as undue influence on an officeholder's
judgment, and the appearance of such influence." Id. at 2357 (citing Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't
PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 388-89 (2000)). The case turns on whether the coordinated expenditures
have the potential to corrupt and whether the limitations placed on such expenditures were
tailored sufficiently to prevent corruption. See id. at 2376-80 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing
that even under standards established in Shrink PAC, limitations on coordinated expenditures
were not unconstitutional because there was no evidence that limiting expenditures prevented
corruption).
320. See id. (referring to contention in Buckley that government could regulate acts that
were "less 'blatant and specific' than bribery").
321. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976) (per curiam) (asserting that interest
in prevention of corruption was adequate to allow contribution limits because possibility and
actuality of quid pro quo agreements undermined integrity of elections); Nixon v. Shrink Mo.
Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377,422 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (maintaining thatBuckley Court
gave prevention of corruption interest very narrow meaning encompassing only quid pro quo
situations).
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that, because oftheir nature, could not pass the corruption standard. Although
this approach would upset a great deal of campaign finance precedent, it is
consistent with Buckley.
V Conclusion:
Recognizing Speech Interests While Allowing for Reform
The American public distrusts the modem campaign finance system.' 2
However, the current constitutional standard stands in the way of popular
solutions." The standard, as first articulated inBuckley v. Valec, requires that
any restrictions on campaign financing survive "exacting scrutiny;" any restric-
tion must promote a significant government interest by closely drawn means .24
Cases subsequent to Buckley claimed that the only governmental interest able
to justify restrictions on campaign spending was the prevention of corrup-
tion.32 The Court frequently has interpreted prevention of corruption to mean
only the prevention of quid pro quo between candidates and donors.326 This
interpretation disallows restrictions on issue ads and soft money that are not
directly contributed to a candidate, thereby eliminating the concern about a
quid pro quo.3' However, the current Supreme Court is unhappy with the
system set up in Buckley and is willing to go beyond the quid pro quo definition
of corruption. 28 Furthermore, a more accurate reading of Buckley reveals that
the Court does not state that the sole governmental interest must be the preven-
tion of corruption.2 Such a reading would allow the Court to uphold reason-
322. See Aaron Bernstein, TooMuch CorporatePower?, Bus. WK, Sept. 11, 2000, avail-
able at 2000 VL 24485128 (relating public sentiment that corporations are "not playing by the
rules" when it comes to campaign finance).
323. See supra notes 229-66 and accompanying text (describing how current constitutional
standard may stand in way of real campaign finance reform).
324. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25 (describing test Court used to uphold contribution limits).
325. See supra notes 141-66 and accompanying text (recounting how test for campaign
finance reforms was narrowed to allow only for those regulations preventing corruption to sur-
vive).
326. See supra notes 141-66 and accompanying text (recounting how test for campaign
finance reforms was narrowed to allow only for those regulations preventing corruption to sur-
vive).
327. See supra notes 79-80 (noting Court's definition ofoorruption); aee also FEC v. Colo.
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 121 S. Ct. 235,2357 (2001) (defining corruption "not only
as quidpro quo arrangements, but also as undue influence on an officeholder's judgment, and
the appearance of such influence").
328. See supra notes 26-48, 268-300 and accompanying text (outlining opinions in Shrink
PAC that indicated frustration with Buckley).
329. See Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976) (per curiam) (asserting only that it was
"unnecessary to look beyond [FECA]'s primary purpose - to limit the actuality and appearance
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able restrictions on campaign finance while still protecting the important First
Amendment rights implicated by the donating and spending of money in
politics.330 Thus, a balancing test based on the "exacting scrutiny" standard in
Buckley would adequately protect the First Amendment rights of candidates
and donors while allowing reasonable reform.
of corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions - in order to find a con-
stitutionally sufficient justification for the... contribution limitation[s]").
330. See supra notes 301-21 and accompanying text (arguing that more liberal reading of
Buckley would allow for more reform proposals to stand).
1154
